

DD307 Social Psychology

2015 Revision Notes

DD307Revision31.doc: This is complete apart from the two conclusion chapters (totalling around a dozen pages, which might be included in a final edition.)

Exam brief

Although the course texts themselves aren't overly massive, there are a number of other resources that take the workload up a fair bit (e.g. the online resources and the project) so I made an early start on revision for the course with a view to producing a version of my ED209/DSE212 style of notes as I go along.

The three hour exam is in four parts although you only answer three parts with a choice of two questions in each part (you must answer questions from three of the parts). The project counts for 30% of the exam mark.

PART 1 INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL SELVES

Questions are from Close Relationships (b2ch2), Self (b1ch5) and Families (b1ch4).

PART 2 – EMOTION AND SOCIAL JUDGEMENT

Questions are from Emotions (b1ch6), Attitudes (b2ch4, TMA5) and FAE (b2ch5)

PART 3 – GROUP PROCESSES AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE

Questions are from Group Processes (b2ch6), Obedience (b2ch7, TMA5) and Prejudice, Conflict, Conflict Reduction (b1ch7)

PART 4 – PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE

Questions are from Embodiment (b1ch8) and Bystander Intervention (b2ch8), where a question may well use the interrogative themes and block Six on-line commentary to test critical evaluation skills. In fact, at least one of these will have interrogative themes as an explicit aspect that students will need to address. This means you can draw on the on-line commentary chapter in Block 6 to demonstrate skills of critical evaluation. Though the module team are also hoping that by the exam, when students will have studied that on-line chapter, critical evaluation aspects of answers from anywhere in the paper will be sharper.

In the assessment section of the website you will find two useful documents:

DD307 Specimen exam paper

Guidance notes for the specimen exam paper.

General points

Individual Differences is covered in the TMA02 question (as a BPS requirement), so it will not appear again as a topic in the exam. Questions in this part will come from the other block 2 topics (families, self, close relationships).

In the rest of the module, TMA topics may also come up in the exam. That said, since TMA1 isn't on the topic list and TMA3 and TMA4 are the project, you really only have TMA5 (obedience) to really draw upon.

(The above section was provided by the tutors)

I hope to beef up the coverage of the exam chapters as the exam approaches and should finish at two or perhaps three pages on each of them vs the page and a half or so that they will be initially.

These notes are designed to be printed double sided so that each chapter will be covered entirely within a double page spread. Although these are my notes for the exam, I generally add lots of hand written stuff in the run-up to exams i.e. don't think of these as sufficient.

Other useful study references include:

- www.foreignperspectives.com is where you'll find both the up to date version of this and additional notes on both this course and others;
- www.tenpencepiece.net has notes on some chapters from an earlier version of DD307 so only some of the chapters covered remain relevant;
- <http://psycho.yellowbell.net/> has notes on the entire course but as they run to around 250 pages, I found them to be a bit much;
- the OU Psychological Society (which I really must join!) run a revision class before the exam; and
- last, but far from least, Erica Cox (who passed away a year or two back) used to produce a really excellent set of notes. Her colleague, Linda Colette, has since taken up the reigns with this.

The chapters:

The sequence used is that from the study guide which means that chapters from the various parts of the exam are grouped together. Where there is a reference to a DSE212 chapter, I recommend that you look at my DSE212 notes for it.

Book 1, Chapter 1, *Crowds* runs to 26 pages and is largely a case study on the riots that happened in England in 2011. This is covered by TMA1 and is NOT covered in the exam.

Book 1, Chapter 2, *Social psychology: past and present* runs to 26 pages. The first half of the chapter runs through the history of a range of social psychological approaches with four interrogative themes taking up the second half of this introductory chapter (which was chapter 1 in the pre-2012 version of the module). This is referred to in TMA6 and it provides a background to everything else in the course.

Book 1, Chapter 3: *Methods and knowledge in social psychology* runs to 28 pages is the second chapter providing theoretical underpinning for the remainder of the course. This is referred to in TMA6 and it provides the background to everything else.

Book 2, Chapter 2, *Close Relationships* runs to 30 pages. As with the other chapters in book 2, this one consists of two quite different articles with some surrounding text to tie the chapter together. This is one of the **part 1 exam** topics.

Book 2, Chapter 3, *Individual Differences* runs to 20 pages and is the main chapter underlying TMA2, hence the notes on this one being done before those on chapter 2. As with the other chapters in book 2, this one consists of two quite different articles with some surrounding text to tie the chapter together. Directly related to chapter 5 on DSE212.

Book 1, Chapter 4, *Families* runs to 22 pages. This is one of the **part 1 exam** topics.

Book 1, Chapter 5, *Self* runs to 23 pages and is one of the **part 1 exam** topics. This starts off by looking at general views of *self* before going through two case studies using the phenomenological approach and two more using the social psychoanalytic approach.

Book 1, Chapter 6, *Emotion* runs to 22 pages and is one of the **part 2 exam** topics.

Book 2, Chapter 4, 'Attitudes' runs to about 30 pages and is one of the part 2 exam topics; the third article is used in TMA5. This looks at the topic through the lens of three different authors. It is related to chapter 7 of DSE212.

Book 2, Chapter 5, *The fundamental attribution error* runs to about 30 pages and is one of the **part 2 exam** topics. It is related to chapter 7 of DSE212.

Book 1, Chapter 7, *Prejudice, conflict and conflict reduction*, runs to about 20 pages and is one of the **part 3 exam** topics.

Book 2, Chapter 6, Group processes: social identity theory runs to about 30 pages and is one of the **part 3 exam topics**. It is related to chapter 1 of DSE212.

Book 2, Chapter 7, *Obedience* runs to 30 pages and consists of extracts from Milgram's original paper, more recent approaches to replicating it and finishes up with a rhetorical analysis of the original research. It's examined by both TMA5 and in **part 3 of the exam** itself.

Book 1, Chapter 8, *Embodiment* runs to 20 pages and is covered in **part 4 of the exam**. Also addressed in chapter 1 of DSE212. Very much a philosophical chapter, so if you're not into that, best skipped I suspect.

Book 2, Chapter 8, *Bystander intervention* runs to about 25 pages and is covered in TMA6 and **part 4 of the exam**.

Block 6, online commentary, *How does social psychology matter? Producing knowledge – evaluating research* runs to 22 pages and is covered by TMA6 and **part 4 of the exam**. Although quite short, this is a rather information rich chapter, hence relatively dense notes.

One word of warning, before you get stuck into reading the rest of this text: these notes condense hundreds of pages from two textbooks, therefore the information density on each page is much higher than in the books themselves i.e. they take ages to read.

Book 1, Chapter 1, *Crowds* runs to 26 pages and is largely a case study on the riots that happened in England in 2011. This is covered by TMA1 and is NOT covered in the exam.

Learning outcomes

By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:

- analyse and evaluate social psychological research on crowd behaviour
- compare and contrast different theoretical perspectives of crowd behaviour
- discuss some practical implications of social psychological research on crowds for understanding real world events such as the England riots of 2011.

As with the other early chapters of this book, the chapter starts with a run-through of the various theoretical approaches that were used to explain things in the past with illustrations taken from a range of types of crowds. The introduction provides the example of a crowd actively encouraging someone to jump to their death in 2010 and points out that Mann (1980) found that such suicide baiting crowds are surprisingly common and that crowds are predisposed to do it when the crowd is large, it is at night and the victim is above the twelfth floor (thus indicating that anonymity is a factor). Paradoxically, although crowds in general are seen as unruly and unpredictable, Reicher (2001) found that there they have a character of their own. The chapter goes on to look at the early, but still influential work of Le Bon (1895!), aspects of deindividuation and its social identity counterpart before considering the 2011 riots as an extended case study.

Le Bon (1895) did not particularly like crowds and considered that individual rationality is lost in them, the **anonymity** leading to more impulsive and suggestible behaviour (hence the book being almost required reading by the likes of Hitler). He tended to adopt a viewpoint of the elite, regarding crowds as unruly mobs and didn't really bother with actual research, relying instead of anecdotal accounts.

Deindividuation theories build on aspects of Le Bon's earlier work in terms of the anonymity dimension. Festinger (1952) considered that rather than there being a **group mind** as Le Bon had proposed that with a crowd individuals stopped seeing themselves as separately identifiable entities but instead as being an anonymous member of a group and with that deindividuation came the **diffusion of responsibility** and hence more impulsive behaviour. Deiner (1980) pointed out that deindividuation is context specific and only happens when attention is diverted from self, thus bank robbers wear masks yet retain individual responsibility for their actions. Zimbardo's (1969) cloaked vs named experiment showed that the creation of a sense of anonymity intensified aggression as echoed by Watson's (1973) study of combatants applying masks and war paint and Silke's (2003) study of paramilitary violence (although there's the question as to whether those planning on being more violent disguised themselves). Mullen (1986) similarly showed that lynch mobs were more aggressive when they were larger (i.e. had a greater sense of anonymity). But it's not just violence that increases: it's even contagious laughter as Freedman and Perlick (1979) showed and Gergen and Barton (1973) with their study of sexual arousal happening between strangers in darkened rooms i.e. it's an increase in disinhibition generally. This disinhibition effect is reflected in numerous studies such as Deiner's (1976) study of children trick or treating either anonymously or identifiably. Johnston and Downing (1979) were even able to tailor the result of the disinhibition through selecting KKK or nurse uniforms i.e. to produce a level of conformity with the expected group norms and this conformity is reported by Postmes and Spears (1998) who also highlighted the difficulty in isolating the deindividuation effect. Critiques of this point out that, for the most part, studies are as outside observers, emphasise the negative and

concentrate on the anti-normative behaviour of crowds. Brown in 1965 highlighted that not all crowds are mobs and distinguished between expressive crowds (e.g. pop concerts), panicking ones and violent ones.

Social identity theory has a somewhat different take on things and Reicher, Stott and Drury argue that rather than losing one's individuality there is instead a move towards a collective sense of identity and that crowds are constrained by group norms. Reicher's (1980) analysis of the St Paul riots in Bristol highlighted that rather than being a wild mob, in fact they operated within significant constraints in targeting authority symbols, leaving local shops largely unscathed and confining themselves to their own area.

Finally, there is the case study of the 2011 riots in England. Levine (2011) takes the typical view that it is "group-think" and contemporary analysis points to debased individuals, loss of rational thought and agitators. However, Reicher and Stott's (2011) later analysis distinguished between police riots in some areas and widespread looting in others i.e. the riots weren't all the same. The police riots in particular seemed to induce the switch to social identity that had earlier occurred in St Paul for similar reasons: the sense of grievance, a feeling that there were no alternatives, a shared sense of identity and growing confidence in collective action all backed up by a lack of dialogue between communities and the police.

Key terms introduced in this chapter are **highlighted above** and are:

- anonymity
- contagion
- deindividuation
- diffusion of responsibility
- group mind
- inductive categorization
- social identity

Book 1, Chapter 2, *Social psychology: past and present* runs to 26 pages. The first half of the chapter runs through the history of a range of social psychological approaches with four interrogative themes taking up the second half of this introductory chapter (which was chapter 1 in the pre-2012 version of the module). This is referred to in TMA6 and it provides a background to everything else in the course.

Learning outcomes (taken from the course text)

By the end of this chapter, you should be able to recognise different traditions in social psychology and situate them:

- geographically (in the USA, the UK and continental Europe);
- historically (in their period of origin and influence);
- methodologically (uses of a variety of qualitative and quantitative approaches)
- in terms of their disciplinary origin (psychology or sociology).

You should also understand the idea of stepping back from the substance of social psychology in order to:

- notice the power relations involved in producing social psychological knowledge;
- ask whether knowledge claims have been appropriately situated in the contexts in which they apply
- recognise where explanations focus exclusively on individual or social factors and try to include both;
- identify assumptions about agency or the determining influence of social structure and recognise when these are mutually exclusive.

The **Introduction** considers how the subject of social psychology came into existence around 100 years ago. In the UK, that origin is the book *Introduction to Social Psychology* by McDougall in 1908 although the earlier 1890 *Principles of Psychology* by James covered many topics in social psychology. Originally rooted in philosophy, the scientific approach was increasingly used by the start of the 20th century in psychology although not in sociology which could not experiment at the level of society. Meade originated the earliest controlled group experiments by 1920, subsequently generalised by Allport in 1924 and by the mid 70s social psychology had become a largely American pursuit. The European roots also started in the late 1800s with Wundt's discussion of laboratory experiments but the European approach remains more tied to the earlier philosophical one and gives more consideration to groups and natural experiments.

Two social psychologies: do we consider how psychology works on an individual within a society (**Psychological Social Psychology**, largely experimental) or do we consider how society operates on individuals (**Sociological Social Psychology**, largely observational)? Where does something like Tajfel's social group research sit in this?

Social psychology: roots and routes begins with noting that the origin of **psychometrics** goes back to Munsterberg in 1913 and its use to sample entire populations. The second world war brought us social psychology which considered a range of things including racial hatred, authoritarianism, national identity and leadership. Should social psychology be aimed at social reform or objectively describing the existing situation? Almost all of the experiments used undergraduate students as their research subjects which obviously has issues in terms of demographics. By 1967 Ring pointed out that there were three strands to social psychology: 1) humanistic action-oriented, 2) a scientific experimental based one and 3) a fun and games one that used cleverly designed experiments to produce counter-intuitive results. Others (e.g. McGuire [1973], Silverman [1977]) criticised the use of deception in experiments or the individualism of aspects of it. Sociological Social

Psychology weighs in with Mead in 1934 and at that time is almost synonymous with **symbolic interactionist** theory; this looked at the development of an internal “I” and an external “me” via the symbolic interaction of people with society.

European social psychology begins with Rijsman and Stroebe's (1989) highlighting of the move from experimental methods to natural experiments (i.e. those conducted in the field). Potter and Wetherell (1987) introduced discourse analysis into social psychology.

Moving on, we come to **Feminist social psychology** which didn't really get going until the 1970s as before that any research on women was generally conducted by men and came to conclusions such as Kohlberg (1958) that few women could reach the peaks of moral development. Critiques from Rogers (2001) highlighted three main issues: 1) the **epistemology**, 2) the **methods** used and 3) the topics studied. Wilkinson (1997) pointed out the political roots of feminist psychology and 1) that women needed to be included in the studies and 2) that in becoming mainstream feminist psychology has lost sight of the need for social change. It can bring to light 1) power relations, 2) listening to meanings, 3) the use of real world topics, and 4) more of an emphasis on relationship rather than individuality.

Finally in terms of the origins, **Critical social psychology** we look at critiquing of what went before just as other areas of social science do e.g. postcolonialism. For example, Foucault in his poststructuralism argues that individuals are products of their time and circumstances. Rose (1990) argues that even our private feelings are subject to outside regulation. Critical social psychology considers that individuals are 1) situated in a time and place, 2) are influenced by relations with others, 3) are subject to change and conflict, 4) have a sense of embodiment and 5) are discursive.

In the second half of the chapter **four interrogative themes** are introduced. These are used throughout the remainder of the texts to analyse the various theories presented along the way i.e. this is merely a brief introduction to them.

Power relations crop up seemingly everywhere in social psychology. As Foucault pointed out, it is present in everything from the production of knowledge through to its interpretation and, notably, in social psychology the experimenter is part of the experiment too. For example, in Milgram's (1965) experiments the experimenter had quite an influence on the subject.

Situated knowledge highlights that social psychology knowledge is not context-free (Haraway, 1991): it is embedded in the historical and social context in which the knowledge was developed. In particular, one needs to avoid over-generalisation e.g. lots of experiments use solely American psychology students as the participants: was Milgram's experiment all that realistic when you note that it used only Stanford (i.e. top ranking) psychology students? Can bias be totally avoided when pre-briefing tells the participants pretty much exactly what the experiment is examining (e.g. the LGBT study cited) [*Demand characteristics*]?

Individual-society dualism considers the split between the actions of an individual within a society and the society as a whole (e.g. Wundt's individual consciousness vs community life). For example, if society is important in development then early intervention such as the SureStart programmes should be employed but if it's down to individual differences (i.e. inherent IQ) then they won't be as effective.

Agency or structure in the explanation of action: are individuals able to operate as independent agents or are they constrained by the structure of society? As usual, it's a bit of both e.g. gays could not decide on their own to marry before society introduced the structures enabling that.

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Book 1, Chapter 3: *Methods and knowledge in social psychology* runs to 28 pages is the second chapter providing theoretical underpinning for the remainder of the course. This is referred to in TMA6 and it provides the background to everything else.

Learning outcomes

By the end of this chapter you should:

- understand the principle and implications of the claim that methods produce knowledge;
- recognise the differences and similarities between the four approaches to social psychology used in this book;
- appreciate the relation between these approaches and their associated methodologies and methods;
- be familiar with the different principles on which these four approaches are based, including those between qualitative and quantitative social psychology;
- be able to situate examples of social psychological research (Milgram's experiments on obedience and the tradition of attitude measurement) in their historical contexts and appreciate their effects on social psychology.

Four social psychological methods. The first third of the chapter is taken up with the working through of an analysis of a newspaper headline about hate using each of four psychological approaches. These each have an **ontology** i.e. a theory about how the psychological object is understood and a **methodology** which together suggest **methods** for study. Thus:

Cognitive Social considers a person to be an information processing unit set in a social context (the ontology). It uses mainly experimental approaches analysed with statistics. Dominant in PSP and studies the individual in controlled situations. The experimental social psychology approach to this considered a bogus pipeline (essentially a fake emotion detector) to look at gloating at others downfall.

Discursive Psychological considers the person to be socially constructed. It analyses discourses and conversation analysis. From the late 70s, emerging from PSP. Looks at the external world and meanings constructed through discourse. This takes the text and analyses the words used and their context as Edwards (1999) in his analysis of discourses following Diana's death.

Phenomenological considers the experience of the individual in relation to others. Looks at rich descriptions of experience and first person written accounts. Arose from philosophy. Considers detailed description of experience from the senses. This seeks to analyse the experience from the inside through epoché in which one's own outside impressions are suppressed in an effort to experience the event through the eyes of the participant.

Social psychoanalytic considers the conflicted psyche in relation to the external world. It considers a social psychoanalytic approach which uses case studies, free association narrative and observation. Generally clinical and not research based until late 20th century. Considers the internal world and its effect on actions. This considered, for example, the formation of group identity from social identity theory, moving on through in-depth interviews to explore how that identity came to be formed through experience.

The experimental approach and the crisis. Danziger (1985) found several issues around the statistical based approaches that needed examination: 1) the belief that statistics are the only valid way to connect data and theory; 2) what represents valid evidence is a constant; and 3) the theory must be accommodated within the methodology and not vice versa. By the 1960s there were issues around the validity of the experimental approach and their ecological validity (Tajfel, 1972). Rosenthal (1966) noted experimenter effects). Overall, this led to too-simplified experiments producing low-impact studies (Silverman, 1973).

The experimental setting: obedience to authority. The separation of *experimenter* and *subject* as in the early interpretations of Milgram's (1963) experiment was clearly lacking in validity: in reality there was a significant obedience to authority aspect in his experiment essentially producing a micro-social environment (Danziger, 1996). This power relations aspect could be altered by changing the environment from the original elegant laboratory in Yale to a less imposing structure reducing the obedience level from 65% down to 48% (Milgram, 1977).

Social psychometrics: the case for attitude research. This really gathered pace by the end of the 1920s (Jones, 1985) and the ability to measure one's attitude by a single number is taken for granted. As Danziger (1996) points out though this loses the subtleties of "it depends" and, on the whole, we tick boxes on Likert (1932) scales which forces us to make absolute choices even in cases where "none of the above" might be more appropriate.

Sampling and generalising in different approaches. Clearly the quantitative methods offer a good deal more potential for generalisability than do methods which produce a small quantity of detailed interviews. Well, no: those interviews may well be generalisable, just not statistically (Hollway, 2012).

Key terms introduced in block one are **highlighted above** and are:

critical social psychology
discourse analysis
epistemology
generalisability
methodology
methods
psychological social psychology (PSP)
social psychometrics
sociological social psychology (SSP)
subjectivity
symbolic interactionism

Book 2, Chapter 2, *Close Relationships* runs to 30 pages. As with the other chapters in book 2, this one consists of two quite different articles with some surrounding text to tie the chapter together. **This is one of the part 1 exam topics.**

The extended introduction to the topic touches on the changes from the traditional family structure through the increasing occurrence of divorce and the rise of non-traditional forms of family. It moves on to note the interest in close relationships grew out of interest in interpersonal and group processes pointing out that the interest is concentrated in the formation process, the maintenance of these relationships and the ending of them. Theories of the propinquity effect (that you'll be attracted to people you are in close proximity to), the effect of similarities and theories about personal attractiveness.

Steve Duck's, 'Developing a steady and exclusive partnership', starts off by pointing out the main limitation of research in this area: that it has primarily considered young couples and thereby does not consider the increasingly common second marriages with their blended families (generally older, of course) which have quite different characteristics e.g. the courtship is generally briefer. **Courting disaster: some early research approaches.** The generally held belief that people who maintain relationships are successes whilst those which break up are failures contribute to the distress at the break-up point as noted by Umberson and Terling (1997). The norm is to assume that the love deepens over time whether or not the relationship is one that is generally accepted (i.e. it includes affairs and gay/lesbian relationships which may not be as openly displayed to outsiders [e.g. Huston and Schwartz, 1995]). Hendrick (1993) categorised love into six types ranging from the self-sacrificing through to romantic. There are, of course, analogies to the childhood attachment types of Ainsworth (1978): secure, avoidant and anxious with Bartholomew (1990) adding fearful and dismissive. Historically, the best predictor of successful courtship was related to religion, economic background, race, age, etc. (Levinger, 1985) and found that couples marrying young were more likely to divorce. The nature of relationships has changed over time with cohabiting couples more likely to eventually marry than be the anti-marriage type expected previously (Cunningham and Antill, 1995). **How 'courtship' grows: some basic views** looks at how the process is managed by the couple e.g. the balance between the relationship and career (Crouter and Helms-Erickson, 1997). Conflict was seen as a bad thing generally but can be good where is not about personal things but rather such things as the roles within the relationship as that can help to smooth things (Lloyd and Cate, 1985). Intimacy isn't as simple as was once thought and grows with the progress of the courtship (Crohan 1996; Veroff et al. 1997). The initial thought that there was one right way to "do" a marriage (Prusank et al. 1993) is questioned by Murstein (1971, 1976, 1977) who found that the initial stimulus (e.g. looks), progressed through considerations of common values to, ultimately, consideration of roles within the relationship (stimulus-value-role [S-V-R] theory). **Is 'courtship' any different from any other relationship?** Considers courtship as a process and practical issue rather than a state or type of relationship. It's a test bed for a new way of life usually between age 16 and 26, the upper end of the range corresponding to a perceived reduction in marketability. **Courtship and others' expectations** reminds us that the couple is also a joining of two families although there is the potential for a Romeo and Juliet effect (Driscoll et al. 1972) if opposition to that joining is experienced. Burger and Milardo (1995), found that couples who were more integrated into each others networks were more stable. Catholics tend to progress slower and stay in bad relationships longer (Cunningham and Antill, 1995). Herold et al. 1998 and O'Sullivan and Gaines 1998 point out that living together isn't easy and requires accommodation. **Other aspects of courtship: [...] sex (and possibly violence)** points out that whilst couples can

work out their own rules in principle, in practice social pressure can reign that in (Bergmann, 1993). Increases in intimacy are generally associated with increases in conflict. **Dating violence** increases in line with dating intimacy. In respect of marriage, Kenrick and Trost (1997) found gender differences: men were violent over concern with reproductive rights, women to protect themselves and their children. **Organization of the relationship** points out that it's about organisation and not just intimacy e.g. working out how to share time together (Huston et al., 1981) which results in four main types of couple: 1) Accelerated–arrested couples start with the expectation of marriage but then slow down but remain close in emotional and affectionate terms. They spend time together and have clear role separation. 2) Accelerated couples start slow but also in the direction of marriage. They're emotionally close and share activities. 3) Intermediate couples move slowly and don't experience turbulence until the end. Not particularly emotionally or affectionate they spend considerable time apart with segregated roles. 4) Prolonged couples have a turbulent path towards marriage, not that emotionally tied and spend little time together with segregated roles. Duck's approach is interdisciplinary, based in the real world, he sees the relationships as having precursors influencing them (self-presentation, identity management and meaning construction), and that they have some general principles guiding them.

Nancy Chodorow, 'The psychodynamics of the family' takes a psychoanalytical approach. **Oedipal asymmetries and heterosexual knots** starts off by pointing out that boys are ahead of the game by having a female as their first love interest (Deutsch, 1969) so are essentially good to go when they come to their first heterosexual encounter whereas girls have to transfer their primary interest to a male at that point. Thus for women, men remain an emotionally secondary but also because of this the father remains an additional love thus overall women have a more complex inner object world. This all gets very complicated as the father is always a separate object unlike the mother which in turn means that men cannot provide the return to oneness. Balint's (1935) 'regressive restitution' occurs with men during sex but not with women. Lots of peculiar arguments later this notes that women have more complex emotional needs than men and that men find these difficult to fulfil. **The cycle completed: mothers and children** points out that for woman, the arrival of a child completes both the triangle of her own childhood and the mother-child-mother cycle. However, for men, it re-introduces the triangle was one of conflict and jealousy. **Gender personality and the reproduction of mothering** points out the obvious that women mother women and are therefore committed to mothering but men who are also mothered by women aren't. Chodorow's approach offers us the possibility of a critical perspective because 1) it shows that we need to consider gender to understand intimacy; 2) it shows the foundations of the individual/society dualism in our development; 3) it challenges the concept of the individual through the complexity of early relationships; 4) it shows the inner world operating on the formation of close relationships. These early gender differences are carried through into adulthood thus women tend to have friendships based around empathy, disclosure and sharing of confidences whereas men's are based around activities and shared experiences (Jamieson, 1998).

Key terms introduced in this chapter are **highlighted above** and are:

attachment styles
fantasy
gender identities
introjection

object relations theory
Oedipus complex
social networks

Book 2, Chapter 3, *Individual Differences* runs to 20 pages and is the main chapter underlying TMA2, hence the notes on this one being done before those on chapter 2. As with the other chapters in book 2, this one consists of two quite different articles with some surrounding text to tie the chapter together. Directly related to chapter 5 on DSE212.

Hans Eysenck and Stanley Rachman, 'Dimensions of personality' introduces the concept of personality and considers how we might measure it by way of **psychometric assessment** of traits i.e. a **trait theory**. Is it a categorical measure (one thing or another) or is it a matter of dimension (degree of, say, stability)? Kant felt that it was categorical whilst Eysenck (1960) is in favour of dimensions (categories being a special case of dimensions of course). Factor analysis is used to elucidate the dimensions although this does have the weakness that there are oodles of ways to condense the factors into dimensions thus **Eysenck' personality inventory** has introversion/extroversion and stability/**neuroticism** whereas Cattell has 16PF, etc. Mapping these onto categories we can have **extroverts** (sociable, party-goer, lots of friends, etc.) and **introverts** (quiet, introspective, few close friends, etc.) but, of course, people are in reality neither one nor the other but rather at some point along the introversion/extroversion dimension. Mischel (1968) observes that these traits are more reflective of the person doing the rating than of the person being rated: an aspect of the fundamental attribution error. There are also issues around the questions used e.g. do you often have headaches? Well, it depends on your definition of "often", doesn't it?

Phillida Salmon, 'A psychology for teachers' takes a different view to the ranking of pupils along the success to failure scale. **Personal construct theory** by contrast considers education to be more of a journey rather than a final destination, something that one does rather than something that is obtained. Thus Kelly sees knowledge as being something that can change rather than something that is fixed. In this sense there is no longer a hierarchy of learning. This is very much the learning by enquiry approach to teaching: more of a teaching how to learn than a teaching of facts. This approach has generally used a form of Kelly's **repertory grid** approach but an alternative is the **Salmon line** (1994) which asks the teacher where they would place each pupil along a line and also asks the pupils where they would place themselves along it. This can throw up quite stark differences in the respective assessments e.g. the technology class where the teacher ranked on creativity but the pupils ranked on the basis of quality of product. This approach has also been used for pupils to mark out significant stages that they would like to reach which in turn can aid in sourcing the assistance to get them there.

Key terms introduced in this chapter are **highlighted above** and are:

extraversion
Eysenck Personality Inventory
introversion
neuroticism
personal construct theory
psychometric assessment
repertory grid technique
Salmon Line
trait theory

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Book 1, Chapter 4, *Families* runs to 22 pages. **This is one of the part 1 exam topics.**

Learning outcomes

By the end of this chapter you should:

- have gained an overview of how families have traditionally been studied in psychological social psychology, especially developmental social psychology
- be able to identify aspects of family processes and relationships that are not addressed by current research and appreciate the contributions that sociological social psychology can make to the study of families
- be able to identify the key features of a discursive psychological perspective and understand how they can be applied to an analysis of identity construction in relation to singleness and the gendered division of labour
- be able to identify the key features of a social psychoanalytic perspective and understand how they have been applied to an analysis of sibling relationships through one case study of five sisters
- be aware that family forms are diverse in relationships and practices according to cultural differences, sexuality and personal preferences.

Introduction. Psychology and families points out that families are usually our first experience of group interaction. Mother-child interactions are commonly studied with fathers largely neglected. There's a concentration on the failures (Cawson et al., 2000) e.g. what mothers in the early years which could that would subsequently promote reading, writing and arithmetic at school. Moving along adolescence is seen as a necessarily turbulent time (Coleman, 1990) with peer input rather than family involvement outcomes (e.g. Heaven, 2001; Larson et al., 2006). **Building a social psychology of the family** reveals some of the rich field that this is with mention of power relations, situated knowledge, individual/society dualism and PSP/SSP among others. The remainder of the chapter concentrates on discursive psychological and social psychoanalytic to explore a range of quite fascinating topics.

Families and change. What is a family anyway? Parents, partners, siblings: yes. What about aunts, uncles, son-in-law? What about ex-son-in-law? The boundary can be quite fluid (McKie et al., 2005). In practice children consider the quality of the relationship and may include teachers, neighbours, etc. if they feel close to them (Edwards et al., 2006) and there are significant cultural differences (Chamberlain, 1999). **Transnational families and identities** are increasingly common. Sutton (2004) found that the definition of family was quite flexible in the Afro-Caribbean families that she studied with family reunion rituals used to retain family ties. **Changing family forms** notes the change from the traditional family forms illustrated in the census (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002) and the conflict between traditional forms introduced by gay/lesbian marriage which are not yet reflected in the selection criteria for assisted conception services (Langdrige and Blyth, 2001).

A discursive psychological perspective on families starts off with the principles of this approach: a focus on the language to construct social identity, existing cultural ideas are drawn upon, analysis of texts (written or spoken), identifying how speech forms are used, and through this analysis to highlight how ideas are constructed. **Singleness** was previously considered as a failure (Adams, 1976) but feminist authors (e.g. Reynolds and Wetherell, 2003) point out that 1) it is a socially constructed concept, 2) it is a social category, and 3) it's a discourse of meanings. Moving on **gender: the domestic division of labour and power** notes that women do more domestic labour than men (Baxter, 2000). However, Dixon and Wetherell (2004) point out that the questionnaire approach

used in this research does not take account of the wider context, negotiations and power relations. For instance, Hochschild (1989) notes that men's participation in domestic chores are considered gifts/favours whilst it's taken for granted that women will do this.

A social psychological perspective on family life considers the relationships of children with their siblings and starts off by considering the **basic principles of a social psychological perspective**: the linking of psychological and social life, conscious and unconscious processes, the importance of anxiety, interior and exterior processes, and qualitative methods. *Splitting* is the separation of good and bad, *projection* is the projection of the bad (or good) from oneself onto an external object, with *projective identification* going a stage further by considering that the object projected onto is changed. **Psychoanalysis and the family** notes that families are places with a whole host of different emotions as they move along. **Psychoanalysis and siblings** Freud considered the parent-child relation as being the most important thus side-lining lateral relationships (e.g. Coles, 2003) and are essentially excluded from theory and clinical practice (Mitchell, 2000). As Mitchell points out siblings are just as likely to be ego ideals as parents (exemplified by the **five sisters** case study). **Subjectivity and interdependence: family, culture and community** uses the five sisters example to highlight the interdependency nature of family.

Key terms introduced in this chapter are **highlighted above** and are:

ego
ego-ideals
id
ideological dilemmas
interpretative
intersubjectivity
introjection
investment
splitting
projection
projective identification
repertoires
subject positions
superego
unconscious desire
unconscious processes

Book 1, Chapter 5, *Self* runs to 23 pages and **is one of the part 1 exam topics**. This starts off by looking at general views of *self* before going through two case studies using the phenomenological approach and two more using the social psychoanalytic approach.

Learning outcomes

By the end of this chapter you should:

- understand the idea that concepts of the self are situated: that is, they emerge in different historical periods and geographical locations;
- be familiar with some of the influential ideas in historical developments of concepts of the self;
- be able to distinguish between concepts of the self and experience of the self, and see ways in which these may exert mutual influence;
- understand and critique the many binary terms that characterise theories of the self;
- recognise phenomenological and social psychoanalytic approaches to the self and the empirical methods that characterise them;
- understand the idea that different methods produce specific and partial accounts of the self.

Introduction runs through a variety of ways in which the self can be described.

Self-consciousness started life when Locke (1694) separated out the ideas of self and consciousness as an observable phenomenon, distinct from the religious based notion of soul and in doing so separated out the notion of a self independent of one's inner and outer actions (Danziger, 1997). Although in third-world cultures it is common to place self in the context of family, in western culture there is the concept of individualisation associated with freedom, autonomy, etc. (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Postmodernism has moved from self to the consideration of one's multiple identities and diverse social influences upon those identities (Frosh, 1991).

Plural social selves considers the difference between the observer and the observed: the I and the me (Mead, 1934). Cooley's (1902) idea of self was based on the concept that one could see oneself as others saw, in three areas: one's appearance, the judgement of that appearance and a self-feeling of one's worth or impact. James (1890) considered that rather than a I-me dualism that there were **multiple social selves**. Borges (1970) considers the "me" who likes coffee etc. and the "he" who has written various books and articles. Goffman (1959) distinguishes the self as performer, self as audience and self as the character being played.

The "individual" self was side-lined in PSP as it was difficult to study but re-introduced by Allford (1943) as studies had shown that ego made a major difference in experimental outcomes and psychology required a concept of self.

The self constituted in language and discourses, moves beyond the I/me formulation and considers the construction of self through language. Is there a single self, or are there multiple selves, perhaps with a core self?

The real me and the true or false self considers whether the self that we present outwardly is the real one or just what we think people want to see (e.g. Big Brother). Rogers (1942) considered that therapists should strengthen the real self that had been distorted by social influences. The American humanistic/phenomenological fusion emphasised self-actualisation in contrast to the European phenomenological approach which was based more on a psychosocial approach. Winnicott (1971) considered the true self as somewhere that those who'd had bad experiences in childhood retreated to, the true self being developed through reflection by the care giver of early responses.

The unconscious intersubjective self moves beyond a self-contained self and considers social interactions. Klein (1988) used an object relations model with **introjection**, splitting

(the **paranoid-schizoid position**), **projection** and projective identification. With maturity she recognised that objects can be seen as having both good and bad, called the **depressive position** which enables the self to be more integrated.

The phenomenological self is about exploring lived experience: being in the world, and the **lifeworld** (the integration of the world as the stage and the life lived within it). Husserl identified three rules to follow: epoché (the bracketing or suspension of our own pre-conceptions), a focus on description rather than explanation and horizontalisation or avoidance of the prioritisation of items described. Three case studies are described beginning with *market shopping in burkas* (Seierstad, 2002), then *respecting the lifeworld of a Alzheimer's sufferer* (Ashworth, 2003) and then *a phenomenology of a working-class experience* (Charlesworth, 2000).

The social psychoanalytic self uses developments of psychoanalysis coupled with social settings. The case study *Vince's choice* considers a working class man who has been forced out of a bad job through illness, the illness apparently having been triggered unconsciously to create a way out of an impossible situation (Jefferson, 2005). *Ester's self-worth* (Turp, 2004) describes a psychoanalytic observation of a baby's development.

Key terms introduced in this chapter are **highlighted above** and are:

anxiety
depressive position
epoché
free association
intersubjectivity
introjection
lifeworld
multiple selves
paranoid-schizoid position
projection
reflexiveness
self-consciousness
self-esteem
unconscious defences

Book 1, Chapter 6, *Emotion* runs to 22 pages and is one of the part 2 exam topics.

Learning outcomes

By the end of this chapter, you should have gained:

- an understanding of the range of contemporary social psychological approaches to emotion;
- familiarity with the cognitive social and discursive psychological perspectives on emotion;
- awareness of contemporary debates in social psychology relating to the role of social and cultural factors in emotion, and the meaning of facial expressions;
- a systematic, critical and sophisticated understanding of key ideas, theoretical debates and epistemology within the social psychology of emotion.

What makes emotion emotional?

James's feedback theory (1884) considers that we experience emotion when we experience changes in our body as a consequence of an event, thus the emotion is the perception of the bodily reaction. Cannon (1927) recognised that particular bodily reactions can be triggered by different emotions and that therefore the emotion must be generated in the brain. Schachter's two-factor theory of emotion (1959) considered that emotion was a combination of autonomic bodily reactions which determined the intensity and knowledge about the situation (cognition) which determined the quality of the emotion.

Appraisal theory

Arnold (1960) considered what makes our perception of events an emotional rather than an non-emotional one. She considered that we only get emotional about events that matter to us. The nature of the emotion depends on who is accountable for it (anger/gratitude if it's the other person, guilt/pride if it's us) and our coping potential (how we can deal with it).

Emotion and social identity

Group identification in appraisal theory is an extension of the above: Doosje (1998) found that people can feel guilty if members of their group did something to feel guilty about. Smith (1993) picked up that group identification made group-relevant events, self-relevant. Strong group identification combined with ambiguous evidence led to lower guilt but unambiguous evidence led to higher collective guilt.

Emotional labour involves working on ones emotions to meet employers needs. Hochschild (1983) found that flight attendants were trained to immerse themselves so deeply in the role that they exuded pleasantness even with nasty passengers.

Basic emotions

The neurocultural theory of emotion (Ekman, 1972) combines biology and socialisation. He considered that some were pre-wired but that others were social constructs.

Facial expression of basic emotions seems to be cross-cultural (Ekman, 1969). Russell (1994) found that the matching was somewhat below 100% in non-western cultures (apart from smiles) and considered that facial expressions are cues rather than revealing the emotion. Fridlund (1994) considered that expressions were expressions of behavioural intention rather than expressions of emotion.

The nature of emotion categories. Russell (2003) argued that emotions are culture-specific.

Emotion discourse

Many of the experiments rely on self-reporting which as Russell (2003) points out may mean that the ratings may be communications rather than straightforward descriptions. Edwards's (1999) discursive approach considers how talking about emotions works in everyday interactions. The difficulty in this approach is that the discursive interactions may represent not only positions responding to others but actual underlying anger i.e. that there could well be non-linguistic underpinnings.

Pre-linguistic emotion

Reddy (2000) considered infants and how they used facial expressions and gestures in their interactions with adults and reflections of themselves. There are significant difficulties in the interpretation of this e.g. is the gaze withdrawal whilst beginning to smile on receiving attention a sign of embarrassment or is it merely a desire for the attention to stop?

Emotion as relation alignment

This considers the alignment of the verbal and the more primitive non-verbal expressions of emotion.

Key terms introduced in this chapter are **highlighted above** and are:

- activation
- autonomic
- emotion discourse
- emotional labour
- group identification
- group-based emotions
- introspection
- pre-linguistic emotion
- relation alignment
- two-factor theory of emotion

Book 2, Chapter 4, 'Attitudes' runs to about 30 pages and is **one of the part 2 exam topics**; the third article is used in TMA5. This looks at the topic through the lens of three different authors. It is related to chapter 7 of DSE212.

Introduction

This chapter looks at attitudes and in particular what people with particular attitudes will do. Allport (1935) defined an **attitude** as 'a learned predisposition to respond to an object or a class of objects in a consistently favourable or unfavourable way'. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) had a similar definition 'attitude is a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour'. Thus 1) there is an implied link between attitude and response 2) there is a non-neutral response i.e. it is somewhere between a positive and a negative response 3) the prediction is about behavioural intention rather than actual behaviour and 4) that the attitude is a permanent feature of a person. For Allport, an attitude is a learned thing but Eagly and Chaiken considered it as part of a person (perhaps biological or unconscious). How is this related to societal influence? There's the whole issue of how we measure attitudes and Bem (1970) notes that attitudes can be influenced by behaviour. The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) attempts to link attitudes to behaviours with the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) attempting to improve upon TRA.

Attitudes versus actions Richard LaPiere (1934).

This outlines a social experiment where the author travelled around the US with a Chinese couple and found that there was no issue in checking into hotels with them yet the same hotels indicated on a questionnaire sent six months later that they would not accept Chinese guests and goes on to question the value of questionnaires in assessing the link between attitude and behaviour.

From intentions to actions. Icek Ajzen (1988).

Attitudes and subjective norms

The **Theory of Reasoned Action** states that intentions are a function of 1) attitude towards the behaviour (a personal factor) and 2) social influence (i.e. their perception of the social pressure, the **subjective norm**). The relative importance of these two factors varies depending on the intention and from one person to another. Attitude towards a behaviour is determined by behavioural beliefs e.g. how easy or difficult the behaviour might be to achieve. Subjective norms are the beliefs (the normative beliefs) concerning how other individuals or groups (called referents) will consider a particular behaviour. The referents are generally in the close social and family circle of the individual. Manstead (1983) considered this in the context of breast-feeding, finding that stronger belief in the bonding aspect or figure improving aspect made it more likely, stronger belief in the embarrassment factor made it less likely. Important referents were the father, closest female friend and the doctor.

The case of incomplete volitional control

The Theory of Reasoned Action works well with purely volitional behaviours. An additional issue are the non-motivational factors such as access to resources and opportunities. Thus intended behaviours are really goals with a degree of uncertainty attached to them. Ajzen's (1985) Theory of Planned Behaviour seeks to address this limitation of TPA by adding in a third factor: perceived behavioural control which considers the perceived difficulty of carrying out the behaviour, taking into account past experience and any potential obstacles.

Unfolding discourse analysis. Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell (1987)

Attitudes in discourse. Starts off with Maguire's (1985) thesis that in measuring attitudes people are locating *objects of thought* along *dimensions of judgement*. It then goes on to critique Marsh's (1976) study on the attitudes to coloured immigrants highlighting issues with 1) the definition of "coloured immigrant" (essentially finding that there is no objective way of defining the category) 2) the value judgements in the scales used by Marsh (not just sympathetic to unsympathetic but very positive to very hostile) and 3) the translation of responses into attitudes.

Discourses on immigration. Considers how a discourse analyst might look at the issue of immigration in New Zealand by way of open-ended interviews. **Context** gives a number of examples showing that in one context the response is quite positive but the same person will add a "but" (a disclaimer) that moves them towards the negative end of the scale (a contrast structure). It illustrates the extreme case formulation (everybody does it).

Variability highlights inconsistencies i.e. that their "attitude" doesn't seem to be that stable. **Constitution** challenges the idea of attitude being separate from object of thought and finds that the object is constructed through discourse (and reconstructed too).

Key terms introduced in this chapter are **highlighted above** and are:

attitudes
constitution
context theory of planned behaviour
discourses
subjective norm
theory of reasoned action
variability

Book 2, Chapter 5, 'The fundamental attribution error runs to about 30 pages and is one of the part 2 exam topics'. It is related to chapter 7 of DSE212.

Introduction

Heider (1958) noted that people tend to attribute the behaviour of others to internal factors whilst they attribute their own behaviour to situational factors. This **fundamental attribution error** in explaining the behaviour of others to internal factors was picked up by Ross in (1977) has received considerable research interest. Heider separated out the dispositional and environmental factors and picked out three things that affected our attribution: 1) factors within the perceiver, 2) properties of the object and 3) mediating conditions.

The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: distortions in the attribution process. Lee Ross, 1977.

Introduction to attribution theory and attribution error

Attribution theory and intuitive psychology

This begins by considering the **intuitive psychologist** and how they might go about their task i.e. 1) considering their implicit assumptions about behaviour, 2) their data collection and how reliable that is, 3) coding and storing of that data, 4) how that data is analysed and interpreted. It then goes on to consider the sounder theoretical principles developed by Heider (1958) i.e. that there are two aspects: 1) causal judgement, i.e. the identification of the causes of the behaviour and 2) social inference, the working out of the dispositions of the actors and the situational factors affecting them. The intuitive psychologist also tries to predict the outcome. Since Heider, most researchers have relied on internal-external (or dispositional-situational) approaches but there are issues around this e.g. did you buy the house because it was secluded (situational) or because you like privacy (dispositional)? Or, you could ignore the form of the causal statement and adopt a social inference approach to distinguish between types of content that 1) applied to everyone or 2) applied uniquely to the subject (this also has situational issues). Behaviour prediction allows questions along the lines of what percentage of people would do X. This predictive approach allows for exploration of bias (presumed to be ego-defensive) which generally find that success is attributed to internal factors and failures to bad-luck (Beckman, 1970). However, 1) internal judgements and external judgements may not be identical and 2) success in tests can be anticipated but failure may not be. Ross (1974) found that instructors felt their performance was the determiner of success and their learners' performance less so. Jones (1971) found that actors and observers diverged i.e. actors were subject to the FAE whilst observers attributed internal factors (Arkin, 1975 found that the assigned causal agent was whatever we were focusing our attention on).

II Attributional biases: instances, causes, and consequences

A The fundamental attribution error

The intuitive psychologist tends to over-estimate the importance of dispositional factors compared to situational ones and generally jumps to conclusions. Jones (1967) found that people attributed internal factors even when they knew about the situational ones in play (i.e. assuming Castro's views were held by the participants).

The fundamental attribution error: a phenomenological critique. Darren Langdrige and Trevor Butt, 2004.

The fundamental attribution error (FAE) is the tendency to attribute the behaviours of others to **internal** (dispositional) causes rather than **external** (situational) ones (Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977). Heider (1958) felt that this was due to the figure being dominant against the situational ground (from Gestalt psychology). McArthur and Baron (1983) felt instead that it arose from perceptual biases, the problem with this being that 1) it seems to be a learned behaviour (children focusing on the situation)m 2) it is not universally dominant across cultures (but Krull et al. (1999) dispute this), 3) there are individual differences (Block and Funder, 1986) and it can be altered in experiments (Tetlock, 1985) 4) moods affect it (happy magnifying, sad reducing) (Forgas, 1998) and 5) it even happens with pencil & paper exercises (Winter and Uleman, 1984). Trope (1986) suggested a two stage process: 1) spontaneous and 2) inferential combining situational cues with prior knowledge of the subject. Quattrone (1982) went for three stages: 1) categorization, 2) characterization and 3) correction. Experimental support from the stage models comes from observations that FAE increases when the observer is busy (Gilbert and Krull, 1988; Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull, 1988). There are both cognitive and motivational effects (Vonk, 1999) so that the effect is lessened when the costs of being wrong is higher. Fein (2001) found that the context made e.g. when the subject is suspected to have ulterior motives. (See cognitive miser effects in DSE212). Thus far, there is no single theory that explains the effect. Lipe's (1991) idea that people evaluate potential alternative causes of actions seems somewhat flakey. Andrew's (2001) evolutionary psychology explanation that it's down to a theory of mind takes a reductionist approach.

Existential phenomenology

The phenomenological approaches aims to bracket out our own pre-conceptions and thus record the **lived experience** in a value-free way (Husserl, 2000). The existential phenomenologists felt that achieving this value-free perspective was impossible (Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty).

Objective thought and the lived world Merleau-Ponty (1962) rejected the notion of objective thought in psychology (the idea that everything in the world is a separate object which can be defined and measured). He identified empiricism as essentially the biological reductionist approach i.e. that we just react to stimuli, and intellectualism i.e. that there is a self controlling things. He considered the lived world as ambiguous as it was neither entirely possible to deconstruct things into object nor was it possible to choose to see things in a particular way. He pointed out that we can simultaneously hold conflicting beliefs.

Dualism and intersubjectivity The Cartesian mind-body dualism in its form of intellectualism makes the category error of assuming that we only have categories of mental and material (Ryle, 1949) but are instead considering the same events constructed in different ways i.e. we are minds inside bodies. Merleau-Ponty considered that it is what goes on between individuals that matters rather than what goes on within a single individual.

A phenomenological understanding of the FAE

Our connection with the world is primarily a practical one: we need to interact with it to get things done. Moreover, we just do things rather than directing our body to do them. There is a need to anticipate the actions of others: the cognitive and motivational factors of Vonk (1999). However, the motivational factors don't solve FAE. Knowing that it exists helps in correcting for it (van Boven, Kamada, and Gilovich, 1999) and there is a developmental aspect to it (Piaget, 1959, Merleau-Ponty, 1962) i.e. as they moved from their shared

world to one of separate objects. FAE assumes the mind-body dualism (Ryle, 1949). FAE explanations have considered two or three stage processes, all relying on perceptual constancy (i.e. that the Joe you saw yesterday is the same one you saw today). We see the person rather than the behaviour (Heider, 1958). Being aware of the figure/ground effect can enable its reversal e.g. through the use of story lines (Ihde, 1984). A phenomenological explanation would consider how people socially construct their *project*, not by looking inside people but by seeing how they fit within society.

Key terms introduced in this chapter are **highlighted above** and are:

attribution
existential
fundamental attribution error (FAE)
internal and external attributions
intuitive psychologist
phenomenology
the 'lived world'

(blank)

Book 1, Chapter 7, *Prejudice, conflict and conflict reduction*, runs to about 20 pages and is one of the part 3 exam topics.

Learning outcomes

By the end of this chapter, you should:

- be able to compare a range of perspectives on the social psychology of conflict
- be able to evaluate critically how the discipline might be used to address some of the problems that characterise divided societies
- have gained an appreciation of the social and historical contexts within which contemporary social psychology operates.

Social psychological perspectives on prejudice and conflict

Early research on the 'prejudiced personality' considered that it could arise from faulty generalisations (Allport, 1954) leading to irrational antipathies. Adorno (1950) considered that **authoritarian personalities** with their conscious respect for convention masked a resentment to traditional authority which in turn became displaced to scapegoat groups. Rokeach (1960) with his notion of dogmatic personality similarly based it in abnormal psychology and argued that there was a **cognitive rigidity**, associated with a very black and white view of the world (e.g. the truncated pyramid).

'Faulty cognitions': socio-cognitive perspectives on prejudice. The Authoritarian and Dogmatic personalities are theories about individuals within the population rather than beliefs that the entire population may hold. Cognitive-social approaches consider the errors that everyone makes, e.g. the **cognitive miser** theory of Fiske and Taylor (1991) [see DSE212 chapter 7] which postulates that we categorise people and things to free up mental resources which leads to stereotyping. This is supported by the capacity constraint notion of Crisp and others (2004). This categorisation exaggerates inter-group differences and minimises intra-group ones (Tajfel, 1963) this leading to faulty generalisations (Allport, 1954). Since they are based on our cognitive functioning, the **implicit prejudices** arising from these categories and stereotypes and have changed the approach from the previous consideration of explicit prejudice (Banajii, 1997). Fazio (1995) found that showing photos of blacks or whites followed by a stimulus word had slower reaction times for positive words when preceded by a photo of a black person yet faster for negative words. Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2003) did a similar thing with morphing faces and also showed that those high in implicit prejudice acted in more explicitly prejudiced ways too.

Group-based approaches: the legacy of Sherif and Tajfel. Researching the 1988 shooting in the Milltown cemetery in 1991 Hunter found that groups attributed either internal or external causality to the actions in line with their religious makeup and that of the actors in the events i.e. outgroups did it for internal reasons, ingroups for external reasons. Sherif's boys camp studies found that when there was negative goal interdependence (i.e. one group could only do better when the other did worse), then this created a climate that strengthened ingroup solidarity and prejudice against the outgroup culminating in violence. Only when he moved to a positive goal interdependence scenario did collaboration between groups result. Rather than treating prejudice as irrational bias, this **realistic conflict theory** considers the prejudice as furthering the aims of the parties in conflict. A complication of this is that social identity theory our sense of self is constructed through our membership of social groups and we take on their stereotypes and in relation to other groups. Hewstone and Greenland (2000) point out that defence of social identity has been the cause of many conflicts.

Serviceable others': the discursive construction and legitimisation of conflict

This considers the discursive construction of rationalisations of conflict (Billig, 1991) using the example of the troubles/conflict in Northern Ireland from two opposing positions.

Social psychological perspectives on conflict reduction

Reicher (2004) considers that prejudice as a natural result of cognitive process is not valid and simply accepts that conflict is inevitable. Many groups in societies do get on well.

Should psychology be merely scholarly or should it advocate for the better?

Getting to know you: the social psychology of contact and desegregation

The paradox of contact **The contact hypothesis** indicates that increased contact can reduce prejudice, but it can also increase it (Allport, 1954). Lemos (2005) found that the more multi-racial a city is, the more negative the racial attitudes tended to be.

When and why does contact reduce prejudice? Pettigrew (1986) said that it should 1) be regular and frequently; 2) occur between individuals who share equality of status; 3) involve a balanced ratio of ingroup to outgroup members; 4) have genuine 'acquaintance potential'; 5) be free from competition n involve interaction with a 'counter-stereotypic' member of another group; 6) be organised around cooperation towards the achievement of 'superordinate goals'; 7) be normatively and institutionally supported. Brewer and Miller (1984) found that it worked best when group differences were minimised. However, Huwstone and Brown (1986) suggest that suppressing group identity in this way won't work and argue instead that it must be an intergroup process, although this celebration of difference can, of course, tip into prejudice. Gaertner and Dovidio's (2000) idea of producing a common identity through re-categorisation although were conflict has been ongoing for a while this is difficult.

Some limits of the contact hypothesis Getting together in the right circumstances has been a very effective approach (Dovidio, 2003). The first limitation is that the research does not address situations such as the Bradford riots in 2001 where the communities were living parallel lives i.e. it doesn't consider how to implement the contact situations. Secondly, the contact tends to consider the individuals as exceptions rather than have them change their stereotypes. Finally, what if the inter-group processes are unrelated to inter-individual processes (Blumer, 1958)?

Towards a discursive analysis of contact and desegregation Hopkins (2006) study considered the way that Muslim's sense of discrimination is religious rather than racial. Although contact is required to reduce conflict, it is seen as subverting Muslim identity.

Key terms introduced in this chapter are **highlighted above** and are:

authoritarian personality
aversive racists
cognitive miser
cognitive rigidity
discourses
dogmatic personality
implicit prejudice
interpretative repertoires
realistic conflict theory
social categorisation
social identity theory
the contact hypothesis

Book 2, Chapter 6, Group processes: social identity theory runs to about 30 pages and is one of the **part 3 exam topics**. It is related to chapter 1 of DSE212.

Introduction

Groups have been around for a long time but there remains the difficulty in separating out the behaviour of the individual and that of the groups to which they belong. Allport (1924) felt that groups just intensified individual behaviour i.e. that a group was merely the sum of the individual behaviours. Asch (1956) picked out the peer pressure or conformity aspect of groups. McGarty and Haslam (1997) in particular considered the effect of other group members on the individual which is a more individualistic approach. Tajfel instead considered inter-group relations (arising from Le Bon's 1896 crowd behaviour research, covered in chapter 1) and moved into the issues of individual identity vs social identification e.g. ethnicity and class. Tajfel (1968) found that we tended to exaggerate the similarities between group members and the differences between groups and argued that this is the basis for prejudice. This is Social Identity Theory (SIT) which considers how people come to be identified with some groups and not others and how that affects our social interactions.

An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. Henri Tajfel and John Turner (1979)

Introduction Starts by mentioning authoritarian personality theories (Adorno, 1950) before moving on to an outline of Sherif's (1966) Rational Conflict Theory (RCT) which considers conflict to arise from competition for scarce resources (see chapter 7)

The social context of intergroup behaviour considers interpersonal interactions to be on a scale between totally dependent on the interpersonal relationships (interpersonal) and being totally dependent on their group memberships (intergroup). The more intense is the intergroup conflict, the more the individuals will conform to the intergroup relationships.

Social categorization and intergroup discrimination introduces the notion that the mere existence of in and out-groups will introduce bias in favour of the in-group (even when the "groups" are randomly assigned i.e. are **minimal groups**).

Social identity and social comparison **Social identity** is simply the parts of one's identity that arise from the social categories to which you belong. From this we have 1) as individuals want a positive self-concept, they will similarly want a positive social identity, 2) as social groups can be positive or negative, they will want their in-groups to be positive compared to the out-groups and 3) since one's own group's value is in relation to others, one will tend to either move to more positive groups or make their own group more positive. Influencing this are 1) the degree of internalisation of group membership, 2) the social context must allow for **social comparisons** and 3) the out-group must be perceived to be a relevant comparator to the in-group.

Status hierarchies and social change Status here is the result of comparison with other groups.

Individual mobility is the tendency to abandon low status groups and move to higher status ones i.e. an individual approach. **Social creativity** is the act of redefining the dynamics of the comparison i.e. a group approach, by a) Comparing the in-group to the out-group on some new dimension e.g. Lemaine (1966) with the huts b) Changing the values assigned to the attributes of the group, so that comparisons which were previously negative are now perceived as positive e.g. the Black is Beautiful campaign Peabody's (1968), c) Changing the out-group (or selecting the out-group) with which the in-group is compared – in particular, ceasing or avoiding to use the high-status out-group i.e. compare your group with a lower status group Hyman's (1942). **Social Competition** through direct competition which RCT predicts will result in conflict. But, when will this competition *not* lead to conflict? First, if the low status results in a lot of individual mobility which reduces group

cohesiveness or secondly if there are high barriers to moving it may stimulate social creativity. Tajfel (1974) distinguished between secure and insecure intergroup comparisons.

'Objective' and 'subjective' conflicts Highlights the difficulty in natural social contexts in distinguishing between subjective and objective conflicts

'Henri Tajfel's "Cognitive aspects of prejudice" and the psychology of bigotry' Michael Billig (2002).

This is basically a rhetorical analysis of Tajfel's 1969 article and in particular considers the things that he omitted. Tajfel's **image of humanity** was that people were rational whilst recognising that in explaining war a blood and guts model was adopted (Tajfel, 1981, Lorenz, 1974). **Against the blood and guts model** was the waxing and waning model i.e. how come we aren't at war or at peace all the time. His moral argument was to the effect that if instinct is unchanging then it suggested that eliminating prejudice is impossible. **Cognition and prejudice** highlights that the irrational may have a rational underpinning. Tajfel argued that judging the out-group unfavourably was simply due to the short-cut of categorisation which in turn exaggerates the seeming in-group similarities and the differences from the out-group. Alongside this he considered assimilation (i.e. the use of pre-existing categories) and coherence in one's world view. However, the discursive theorists consider that the categories are created in discourses rather than through perceptions (Billig, 1985). **Holocaust and explanation** Tajfel despite suffering in the holocaust did not apply his theories to it, but neither did the other survivors provide much written or spoken for some time afterwards. This may have arisen from the understanding equating to forgiveness argument (Billig, 1996). **Prejudice and bigotry** Again there is the waxing and waning so an explanation using solely categorisation, assimilation and coherence won't be sufficient. Bigotry seems to add emotional and motivational factors to prejudice although Tajfel doesn't speak much of the required **emotional investment**, mainly as this is an individual factor rather than a group one. **Depersonalisation and dehumanisation** were considered as being on a continuum by Tajfel (1981). **Towards a theory of bigotry** considers a series of aspects such a theory might have: 1) Bigotry as **ideological**: the group-based aspect of assimilation, 2) Discursive basis of bigotry: the integration into discourses (Billig, 1987), 3) Emotional aspects of ideology: considers the social and discursive nature (Billig, 1999), 4) Reconceptualising depersonalisation and dehumanization in discursive terms: the continuum with dehumanisation occurring at the extreme end with **hate-talk** (Billig, 2001) and with emotion included. 5) Repressed and unrepressed emotions: the repression of bigotry making it a temptation, and 6) Pleasure in bigotry: with the freedom may come pleasure hence extreme racism is not necessarily lacking in humour.

Key terms introduced in this chapter are **highlighted above** and are:

depersonalisation	minimal groups
emotional investment	social categorisation
hate-talk	social comparison
ideology	social competition
individual mobility	social creativity
intergroup behaviour	social identity
interpersonal behaviour	

Book 2, Chapter 7, *Obedience* runs to 30 pages and consists of extracts from Milgram's original paper, more recent approaches to replicating it and finishes up with a rhetorical analysis of the original research. It's examined by both TMA5 and in **part 3 of the exam** itself.

In coming up with the concept for the experiment, Milgram was in the period following WW2 when there was a fair bit of interest in exploring the background to the concentration camps: was it the case that anyone would “just follow orders” in those circumstances? When would people disobey? Although there are obviously less negative areas where obedience would be of interest, Milgram was specifically interested in the negative variety (**destructive obedience**).

Milgram's experiment: Behavioural of obedience

In exploring obedience, Milgram clearly had to take a less extreme approach than in the concentration camps. What he did was to recruit 40 males from the general vicinity of Yale University for a psychological experiment on learning. During the experiment, they were required to ask the “learner” (a confederate of the researcher) a series of questions, applying electric shocks of increasing voltage to them each time they made a mistake whilst being themselves observed by one of the researchers who would prompt them with a series of four verbal “prods” whenever they were reluctant to proceed with the experiment. In practice, only the 45V shock was ever applied but the learner acted as though increasingly painful shocks were applied to him.

Whilst all those asked prior to the experiment predicted that only a tiny minority would proceed through to the highest voltage, in practice everyone went beyond the predicted cut-off point and they only began to cease obeying when the learner started kicking on the wall (i.e. at 300V). Although they continued, many were somewhat stressed by the end of the experiment.

Milgram felt that there were four factors which contributed to the high level of obedience: 1) it was undertaken on the grounds of a prestigious university, 2) the subjects had volunteered and would feel under an obligation to complete it, 3) they were told the shocks were painful but not dangerous i.e. the scientific gains would outweigh the pain, and 4) by continuing to respond, the learner appeared willing to continue (hence no drop-out 'til they ceased responding).

Commentary

Various replications of the experiment have generally produced similar results i.e. that almost everyone will go right through to the end, albeit many of them exhibiting signs of stress in doing so as Blass (1999) reports. Milgram himself varied some of the conditions in subsequent experiments showing that the closeness and legitimacy of the authority figure will affect the results significantly (1974): lower legitimacy reduced the power relationship and thereby compliance from 65% to 48%. He reasoned that obedience required a shift towards an **agentic state** whereby we hand responsibility over to the authority figure. The original experiment raised significant ethical issues around the stress caused to participants, the deception and revealing their personal viciousness (Mixon, 1972) although Milgram didn't accept these criticisms. More recent replications have changed significant aspects e.g. Burger (2009) limited the shocks to 150V and Danbrum and Vantiné (2011) used an **immersive video environment**; all these have broadly had the same findings as Milgram. Whether **experimental realism** translates into **mundane realism** is still up for debate (e.g. Brannigan, 2004). Historical studies (e.g. Mastrionni, 2002)

indicate that genocide and the like are more to do with a moral conviction that one is right rather than following some authority figure i.e. that participants in real-life atrocities may be willing (e.g. Brannigan (2004) points out that police could, and did, easily opt out of the initial mass shootings).

A rhetorical analysis of Milgram

Unlike most experiments, the Milgram one has had a considerable degree of attention paid to it in the subsequent years, the extensive records which he kept in the form of comprehensive audio records, various videos and, of course, the notes have been analysed in various ways. Rhetorical analysis (Billig, 1991) examines the verbal interactions between the researcher and the participant. Amongst the rhetorical approaches that the participants used to disobey were the redirection of the source of the authority from the researcher to the learner by the participant denoted “Professor of Old Testament” who also recategorises the prod “there is no permanent tissue damage” as an opinion (thus challenging the researcher's authority). The participants didn't always fall into rhetorical responses that matched the four prods so there was more flexibility in using these and variations on them than was originally reported by Milgram. The “you have no other choice” prod introduced an element of choice and seems to have been the least effective of the four because of that as it could be turned round, the other choice being to discontinue with the experiment. The prods themselves are not in the form of orders as would be expected for obedience but rather in the form of arguments to persuade although as Drew (1984) points out, that distinction may not be entirely relevant as people “obey” grammatical structures which are not themselves orders. As Darley (1995) points out, the experiment was not nearly so standardised as Milgram implied e.g. the prods were not applied consistently nor consistently in the sequence specified. As well as highlighting shortcomings of Milgram's methods, this kind of analysis also highlights limitations in experimental psychology which does not consider in detail the language used.

Key terms introduced in this chapter are **highlighted above** and are:

agentic state
destructive obedience
immersive video environment
mundane versus experimental realism
rhetorical analysis/rhetorical psychology
witcraft

Book 1, Chapter 8, *Embodiment* runs to 20 pages and is covered in part 4 of the exam. Also addressed in chapter 1 of DSE212. Very much a philosophical chapter, so if you're not into that, best skipped I suspect.

Learning outcomes

By the end of this chapter you should be able to:

- critique simplistic mind–body, individual–social and agency–structure dualisms and appreciate how the body, self and society are interconnected;
- describe how discursive and phenomenological psychologists conceptualise the body;
- compare and contrast the methodologies and findings of discursive and phenomenological researchers;
- critically evaluate discursive and phenomenological approaches to the body.

Identity and the Body

Resisting a body-mind-social split. From Descartes in the 17th century to the 20th there has been a sense of **mind-body dualism**. However, in recent times psychology has concentrated more on the mind although there has also been a strong focus on the biological/genetic (Schwartz, 1997). In terms of dualisms there is the individual-social and agency-structure.

Body as an 'identity project'. Popular culture gives us lots of advice on clothes to wear and even plastic surgery to have e.g. Michael Jackson's change from black to white. This suggests that our bodily identity is not fixed. Giddens (1991) noted how we use our bodies to pursue lifestyles i.e. they become part of our identity project (Nettleton and Watson, 1998). These are about making us feel good about ourselves, creating an island of security with the system of global risks (Shilling, 1997). Are these individual choices or socially imposed (e.g. Chernin, 1983, points out that slenderness is “in” whereas in the 1950s it was curves), somewhat of a big deal for feminists, of course. With these dualisms, one is generally subordinate to the other (Grosz, 1994).

Discursive psychology and the body

This is largely from Foucault's (1972) work which argued that the world only makes sense through discourse. Phenomenologists do not, of course, support this approach as their world-view is that it's the experience that counts.

Discourses: shared social meanings. Bodily meanings are not just tied to bodies but are also related to culture and social meanings (Burns, 2006). Bulimia and anorexia can be interpreted in terms of responses to cultural norms (Bordo, 1988). Also relevant is Michael Jackson's body project in terms of ethnic identity.

The historical context of discourses. Illness categories change e.g. depression didn't exist until the 1930s (Gergen, 1999).

Discourses and power relations. Foucault saw the sciences as establishing what was normal through labelling things – this is why it's so important to people to have a name for their disease (Horton-Salway, 1998). However, that gives control to the medical establishment and others have urged the retaking of control (Oakley, 1984).

Discourses constituting the body and body practices. This has a lot of scope e.g. able-bodied=normal → disabled=abnormal, heterosexual=normal → homosexual=deviant. Self becoming object in medical contexts (Twigg, 2002). **Queer theory** tries to break up the binaries of gay/straight, male/female (Butler, 1990).

Phenomenological accounts of 'lived experience'

This is all about the lived experience (Nietzsche, 1883). The key ideas are 1) bodily consciousness and 2) a connection between the body and the world.

Consciousness of the body. Body-subject i.e. you are your body (Merleau-Ponty, 1962) encompasses a whole range of things that you experience throughout your life. Body-object is you as known by others (Finlay, 2006) and can be experienced when you're ill. **Bodily self-consciousness** is when you become aware of your impression on others (Sartre, 1969).

A body-world interconnection. This is the sense of **being in the world** (Heidegger, 1962). He later (2001) went on to consider that **bodiliness** extends beyond the body e.g. in pointing we reach out to the object being pointed at. The sense of merging of body and world is picked out in the example of pregnancy quoted by Young (1985).

Experiencing multiple sclerosis: a case illustration. Finlay (2003) illustrates some of the experiences such as the feeling of an arm being non-self caused by the loss of sensation from MS.

Burkitt (1999) considered the body to be 1) productive (i.e. capable of activities), 2) communicative, 3) powerful (capable of changing things) and 4) thinking. Thus we can change social conditions rather than being permanently constrained by them

Key terms introduced in this chapter are **highlighted above** and are:

being in the world
bodiliness
bodily consciousness
bodily self-consciousness
body-world
Cartesian dualism
chiasm
corporeal feminism
disciplinary technologies
existential-phenomenological method
flesh
interconnection
mind-body dualism
objective body
queer theory
subjective body
the docile body
transgenderism

Book 2, Chapter 8, *Bystander intervention* runs to about 25 pages and is covered in TMA6 and **part 4 of the exam**.

Introduction

This takes the murder of Kitty Genovese in 1964 as the basis for two separate analyses of what happened. She was murdered and raped as she walked home in the early morning by someone she didn't know. More strikingly perhaps is that 38 people witnessed the incident but did nothing about it. Quite why nobody even called the police at the time has been the subject of various studies which Darley and Latané felt was due to the diffusion of responsibility i.e. everybody thought that somebody else would report it and more generally that the more people who are present at an incident, the less likely it is that anyone will help. Cherry's article takes a feminist approach to the incident and comes to quite different conclusions.

Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. John Darley and Bibb Latané (1968).

This starts off with a more detailed account of the circumstances, noting that the attack took around 30 minutes and that amongst the 38 witnesses, there'd have been knowledge that others were seeing this happen by way of the lights in the windows. He postulated that three effects were in play 1) the presence of onlookers, 2) the diffusion of blame and 3) the assumption that someone else was helping. His hypothesis was that the likelihood of helping was reduced in proportion to the number of potential helpers and set about an experiment to test this. His experiment brought a naïve subject into the laboratory and had one of the confederates simulate a seizure. The group size was varied as was the gender of the victim. As expected, almost all (85%) of the two person (subject+victim) group helped, but only 31% of those in six person groups did so with the four person groups coming in at 62%. There were no gender differences in the responses but this was a "report the incident" case rather than "do something about it" (which would normally get a higher male response [Berkowitz, 1964]).

Kitty Genovese and culturally embedded theorizing. Frances Cherry (1995).

She begins by pointing out that none of us operate in isolation to society and that we each bring along our own baggage. In particular, psychology students have for decades known of this via the article above which considered situational factors rather than the social ones which the media in 1964 were largely concerned with. Cherry uses Brownmiller's (1975) analysis that the killer was just looking for a lone girl to kill, to consider a more feminist analysis of the incident. She points out that in 1965 there was not the recognition of widespread violence by men against women e.g. Borofsky (1971) finding that males didn't intervene in male against female role-play attacks but did in others whereas women just didn't intervene in any. Shotland and Straw (1976) found that interventions were more likely when the simulated attacks were perceived as by strangers (65%) than married (19%) and were more likely to assume that male/female were intimate if they weren't sure. The article goes on to consider more of the coverage of the case at the time e.g. that the paper didn't report that the killer was black (which they argued wasn't relevant to their story as he'd went out to kill "any girl").

Key terms introduced in this chapter are **highlighted above** and are:

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Block 6, online commentary, *How does social psychology matter? Producing knowledge – evaluating research* runs to 22 pages and is covered by TMA6 and **part 4 of the exam**. Although quite short, this is a rather information rich chapter, hence relatively dense notes.

Introduction

Reminds us of the **historical and contextual embeddedness** of the psychological concepts introduced throughout the course and in particular the **situatedness of knowledge** i.e. placing it within a particular era and everything that goes into the makeup of that era. The **reciprocal relationship between research and social world** reminds us that research isn't carried in isolation to the social world but instead relates to the social, political and historical contexts in which the research is embedded and in particular the power relations involved. **Critical evaluation** encourages us to take on a **productive scepticism** to any research. **Perspectives and paradigm shifts** reminds us that the new paradigms available do not always supplant the older approaches but rather co-exist with them. **Four research perspectives** reminds us of 1) the cognitive social, 2) the discursive, 3) the phenomenological and 4) the social psychoanalytic perspectives presented throughout the course. **What does it mean to 'step back'? Tools for critical evaluation?** Considers what it means to *step back*, or critically evaluate the texts and the use of the interrogative themes to do that.

Three modes of critical evaluation

Introduces three approaches to evaluation: 1) within perspective, 2) between perspectives and 3) meta-perspective.

Critical Mode 1 – 'Within Perspective' uses the rules of the perspective that we are critiquing. For example, for a cognitive research piece we might criticise the scales that were used, how a questionnaire was applied or perhaps how relevant it was in the real-world. In particular, this approach does not criticise the underlying validity of the perspective.

Critical Mode 2 – 'Between Perspectives' compares the research using a different perspective. For example, critiquing Milford's cognitive work using Gibson's discursive framework.

Critical Mode 3 – 'Meta-Perspective' steps outside the perspectives and uses approaches like the interrogative themes to perform the critique e.g. power relations and situated knowledge. Do the power relations produce problematic (e.g. assumptions made) or beneficial effects. How situated in its era and culture is the research? The example of bystander intervention portrayed by the Genovese case illustrates that discussions of it were situated in that time thus missing the sexual and gender issues picked up later along with the power relations in terms of gender relations in that era.

You don't know what love is...?

Takes a critical evaluation of research into love and in particular romantic or intimate love, taking three articles and analysing them in terms of how they describe the phenomenon, their method and the aim of the research. **Three perspectives on love** takes an article using each of the cognitive social, discursive and phenomenological approaches. **Threads for critical evaluation of Love research – examples** goes on to critique the approaches noting that the methods and aims varied wildly. *Critically evaluating the Discursive study of Love* considers if the perspective was appropriately applied and if this was an appropriate approach for such a study. *Moving to Critical Mode 2* critiques the discursive approach from the phenomenological viewpoint e.g. it was too superficial and didn't attend to what was said. Using situated knowledge, this seems to have been ignored i.e. there was no consideration of context. Power relations would consider the cognitive approach as making

it difficult for others to challenge it. *Moving into Critical Mode 3* considers which approach might be the most useful with power relations and situated knowledge guiding this further. **A 'between perspectives' debate of Social Psychoanalytic research** signposts some points of debate on the case study of Vince in book 1 chapter 5.