DE300 Revision Notes

DE300Revision20.doc: This is a work in progress edition. However, it is only missing the notes on chapter 1 and the tidy-up edit i.e. it is complete enough to do up to TMA4.
Exam brief

There isn’t one!

However, three of the TMAs combined with the EMA take its place with the other three TMAs being normal ones that form part of the continuous assessment for the course.

The course texts themselves are essentially two books divided into one rather chunky one and a slimmer one which covers each of the three methodologies which you can take in the project. In addition, there are a considerable number of online resources (some 7GB worth) comprising various texts (generally in ePUB, PDF, etc.), audio, video and several software packages.

Your previous modules may limit the methodologies that you can use in the project. So, for example, if you have previously done DD307 Social Psychology, which includes a text based project then you can’t do a text based one in DE300. Similarly if you have done a cognitive course including an experimental project then you can’t do an experimental project in DE300. However, everyone studies all three methodologies, albeit omitting the extensions aimed at project methodologies that they won’t be using and you only need to study one of the three chapters in the second book.

Block 1 – Introduction

Block 2 – Investigating Memory

Other useful study references include:

- [www.foreignperspectives.com](http://www.foreignperspectives.com) is where you'll find both the up to date version of this and additional notes on both this course and others; and
- Linda Corlett produces a really excellent set of notes.
The chapters:

The sequence used is that from the study guide. Where there is a reference to a DSE212 or DD307 chapter, I recommend that you look at my DSE212/DD307 notes for it.

Book 1, Chapter 1,
(this section will be filled in once the notes for the chapters are completed)

One word of warning, before you get stuck into reading the rest of this text: these notes condense hundreds of pages from two textbooks, therefore the information density on each page is much higher than in the books themselves i.e. they take ages to read.
Book 1, Chapter 1, *Introduction: critical, creative and credible*, runs to 40 pages and provides an introduction to the three methodologies used throughout the course (experimental, survey and text-based). It isn’t explicitly covered by any of the TMAs, so I will be doing the notes on this last.

**Learning outcomes**

By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
- describe the three main methodologies discussed in DE300;
- carry out a citation search; and
- carry out a literature search.

This begins by describing the relationship between
Book 1, Chapter 2 Investigating memory: experimental and clinical investigations of remembering and forgetting runs to 40 pages and is one of the three chapters that are options on the first TMA.

Learning outcomes TO BE INCLUDED

**Introduction** re-introduces the encoding, storage and retrieval model of memory and points out that there are different types of memory which are considered in more detail throughout the rest of the chapter.

**What types of memory are there?** This begins by introducing the idea of remembering as a form of mental time-travel (Tulving, 2002) made up of a series of episodes and autobiographical events. There is a distinction between declarative memory (i.e. memory of events) and non-declarative memory (i.e. memory of processes). The episodic memory is linked to the hippocampus and medial temporal lobe (MTL) (as evidenced through brain damage and observational/experimental studies). Memory malfunction: the evidence from neuropsychology and amnesia goes on to consider what happens when something goes wrong in particular examining the cases of Clive Wearing and Henry Molaison who, through losing the ability to lay down new memories, are essentially always living as though they had just woken up. Although in both cases their episodic memory is gone, they retain their procedural memory so CW can still play musical instruments. This anterograde inability to create new memories contrasts with retrograde amnesia which is the loss of memories previously laid down. The general lack of loss of semantic memory (i.e. language or intellectual impairments) implies a separation of these from episodic memory (Tulving, 1985). All cases are different as a consequence of the differing causes and different brain regions affected. Memory brain regions: the key role of the hippocampus begins by pointing out that since the damage to CW’s brain was to the hippocampus and since he both retained knowledge of events before the damage and was able to carry on normal conversations (thus retaining short term memory), these functions must take place outside the hippocampus (Milner). Moreover, he could still acquire new vocabulary and new semantic information (albeit inconsistently) (Corkin, 1984, 2002). Other damage in areas adjacent to the hippocampus points to these having an role in laying down long term memories (e.g. the fencing foil incident). Converging evidence for the role of the hippocampus in memory starts with Krebs (1989) study of birds that found those with larger hippocampuses were better at remembering where they stored food with Sherry and Hoshooley (2010) finding that it was largest at the times of year when chickadees stashed their food. O’Keef (1976) found that rats build an internal map of their enclosures using place cells and head cells which acted as direction indicators. Maquire (2000) found a similar effect in London cab drivers: the hippocampus increased in size with experience in the job (would this still apply now that GPSs are used?). Huppert and Piercy (1976, 1978) highlighted the difference between familiarity and recognition in their experiert with Korsakoff patients: both normal and afflicted patients had very similar scores on familiarity but quite different ones on recognition of having seen the images the same day or the day before. Shimamura and Squire (1987) referred to this difference as source amnesia i.e. a difficulty of recalling when things happened. Korsakoff patients also exhibit confabulation, the remembering of things that didn’t happen (Moscovitch, 2002) which may be related to déjà vu. Malfunctioning mental time travel: retrograde amnesia and the temporal gradient introduces the concept of retrograde amnesia i.e. the loss of memories predating the damage which tends to have a temporal gradient with earlier memories being more resilient. Consolidation theory (Squire, 1992), proposes that after a time in the hippocampus the memories are consolidated elsewhere. Takashima
2009) illustrated this and it has been shown through damage to the hippocampus largely affecting recent memories rather than distant ones (Squire, 1992). That said, there is a reminiscence bump in autobiographical memories around the teens and twenties. Autobiographical memories are difficult to test for accuracy and may have a social or family memory effect. Knowing what you don’t know you know: explicit versus implicit memory picks up the idea of explicit memory (what happened when) and implicit memory (procedural). For example, Henry Molaison (HM) could improve his performance on a motor task yet couldn’t remember practicing it. In the case of Parkinson’s this is reversed i.e. they have episodic memory but can’t learn new processes.

**Testing memory: a few reflections** starts off by noting that memories consist of events that have an item, a time and a place and that usually we will have some cue to trigger the recall. Laboratory tests are generally either free recall, cued recall or recognition tests. Standing (1973) showed that recognition is very easy to do. Huppert and Piercy (1976, 1978) suggested that it is the links between event and times is broken in amnesia i.e. it is in the reconstruction that the problem occurs. Notably, impaired familiarity with normal recollection doesn’t happen. Note that serial recall (recalling items in order) is harder than free recall for normal adults but the reverse applies in Alzheimers patients (Cherry, 2002).

**Familiarity versus recollection: neurological correlates** notes developments in memory research on ageing with the latest (Tree and Perfect, 2004) indicating that it is the linking of source and item that is lost on ageing i.e. you’ll know something but not be able to relate it to when it happened. Thus Cohen and Faulkner (1989) found that there were difficulties in source based information.

**Modelling memory** introduces two different memory models. **Model 1:Aggleton and Brown’s (1999) neural model of episodic memory** posited that memory had system 1 that in the hippocampus/mammillary bodies/thalamic regions that dealt with episodic information (explicit memory and recollection) and system 2 in the MTL which dealt with familiarity i.e. context free memory. Squire (2000) and others have argued that there is no functional difference and that the whole MTL is used in memory. It’s supported by Korsakoff patients who have pre-frontal cortex lesions and who do well on familiarity tests but poorly on others (Ranganath and Knight, 2003). **Neuropsychological evidence for the two-system proposal underpinning recall and recognition** is supplied by Mayes (2002) who had a patient with hippocampus damage performing well on recognition but poorly on recall. **Neuropsychological evidence against the two-system proposal** Chan (2002) had a similar patient who performed poorly on both recall and recognition as did Squire (2007). Davachi and and Wagner (2002) present fMRI evidence showing that there is always some hippocampus activity in memory. **Model 2:Baddeley and Hitch’s working memory model** took account of the recency effect in memory and proposed that all incoming information is held in short term memory before being transferred to longer term memory by way of a working memory (Short Term Storage, STS) which had a limited capacity. Baddeley and Hitch (1974) using a dual task experiment showed that working memory and STS weren’t the same thing. From this, they proposed that there were multiple STS areas (e.g. verbal, image). Baddeley (1975) showed that there was no difference in the number of short or long words that could be remembered but only if they were presented visually. Modes include audio, visual and spacial (Baddeley, 1980). An important part of this model is the central executive which Baddeley proposed as the mechanism by which focus, task switching and prioritisation was achieved. Alzheimer’s patients are unable to perform tasks concurrently even when they are at an appropriate level of difficulty. Finally there is the episodic buffer which can hold around four parts of information (Allen, 2012) and enables us to remember a sentence when ordinarily we can
only remember around two seconds of random words.

Introduction highlights some of the difficulties of experimenting in real-world experiments e.g. lack of controls, lack of objective facts to compare the memories against and the ethical issues. What can experiments tell us about remembering falsely? The approach in experimentation follows an encoding phase, provision of post-event information (which may be false) and retrieval. Loftus has explored the provision of misleading information through leading questions, discussions with co-witnesses and been able to influence the remembering of childhood incidents that didn’t happen and even short term food preferences. Chandler (2001) found that these false memory effects were temporary i.e. that the original memory was retained. The effectiveness of the false memory was found to depend on how plausible it was (Walther and Blank, 2004). Taking false memory into the laboratory starts by discussing the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) concept of inducing false memories implicitly e.g. inducing participants to remember that they heard “bed” when the initial list was duvet, pillow, sheet, etc. Zhu (2013) found that the underpinning mechanism in DRM false memories and explicit ones appeared to be different.

Laboratory experimentation points out that although psychology laboratories may be essentially normal offices, the environment remains an artificial one. A laboratory experiment on the other-race effect reports on Anzures (2014) study of children’s recognition of faces from other races which found that there was no statistical difference in recognition from 5 to 10 year olds although they did recognise Chinese faces less accurately. Extrapolating to the real world points out a number of limitations to Anzures experiment: it was artificial setting, it used artificial stimuli (e.g. it was a 2D photo), the task was artificial (2AFC, in rapid succession), it used an artificially short time-span, it utilised explicit memory and the consequentiality and motivation was clearly quite different than in a line-up situation. Thus, on the whole, ecological validity was somewhat lacking: as Gibson (1979) illustrated, a picture of a pipe is not itself a pipe.

Face recognition introduces the concept that face recognition may involve a special type of memory. Are faces special? Our exposure to examplars of the category face is clearly much greater than for other categories and moreover, whilst we don’t need to distinguish between individual pineapples, we do need to distinguish between individual faces. But are we treating faces in a fundamentally different way? Face specificity or expertise? Introduces Prosopagnosia (the inability to recognise faces) and points out that people can have that whilst being able to recognise everyday objects or vice versa (Farah, 1991, McMullen, 2001). Although this seems to imply that faces are recognised differently, it could equally be that the damage was to areas involved in more general processing, e.g. memory of fine detail. Yin (1969) noted that when objects are presented upside down, everything except faces is recognised, which he suggests is evidence that face recognition is a different type of process. However, Bruyer and Crispeels (1992) showed that it was more an aspect of familiarity with the exemplars than specifically of faces that differentiated the upside down slowing down of recognition. This expert effect has been demonstrated in training (Rossion, 2002) but not with experts on birds (Gauthier, 2000) and other categories. Familiarity in face recognition discusses the different quality of recognition that comes with familiarity: we can recognised friends immediately even after many years but have difficulty in picking out someone who we have not seen a great deal:
a familiarity effect that applies equally to groups. Biases in face recognition considers the Other Race Effect (ORE), the relative difficulty in recognising faces from different races. Brigham and Malpass (1985) showed that this was an aspect of familiarity. There is also some evidence of an Own-Age Bias (OAB), although this seems less consistent. Bartlett and Leslie (1986) showed that younger participants recognised faces around their own age better than they recognised older ones but that the older ones didn’t have that bias, although there are issues around their age banding. Other studies with tighter banding have shown the effect at all age bands (Perfect and Moon, 2005 and others). The level of contact is considered the deciding factor with the cognitive approach of Hancock and Rhodes (2008) coming down on the level of experience and essentially training being the decider. However, it could be argued that it is a social categorisation effect that determines how we process the face e.g. the categorisation-individuation model (CIM) (Hugenberg et al., 2013) which suggests that the categorisation happens first with only the in-group being considered at an individual level. Practical implications of biases in face recognition illustrates that this ranges from embarrassment to potentially major issues in line-up identification. This is something of a problem as eyewitnesses are believed about 70% of time whether or not they seem reliable (Loftus, 1983). Whilst the laboratory studies have a lot of power (lots of participants, each with lots of data points), they are severely lacking in ecological validity both in normal life and in line-up situations.

Eyewitness evidence just points out how crucial effective eyewitness evidence can be. Identity parades (line-ups) starts off by describing the simultaneous and sequential line-up procedures with Stelbay’s (2001) finding that the sequential line-ups were more accurate. However, McQuiston-Surrett (2006) found that sequential line-ups were only more effective when the perpetrator wasn’t present i.e. they reduced the chance of identifying a suspect who was innocent. In simultaneous line-ups, the person who looks most like the perpetrator may be chosen even when they are instructed that the perpetrator may not be present due to pressure from the situational context (Mermon, 2003). By contrast, in sequential line-ups, they are forced to make absolute decisions rather than relative ones. The mystery man procedure introduces the idea of having a mystery-man in the line-up specifically for children so that they can select the mystery-man as a positive “don’t know” selection which overcomes the pressure that children feel to make any selection in the situation (Havard and Memon, 2013). Applied memory experiments highlights the differences between Anzures (2014) experiment which used large numbers of images but required a forced choice seconds later vs Havard and Memon (2013) which used a video viewed once and tested recognition a few days later i.e. having much higher ecological validity. What affects eyewitness evidence? Considers the effects of estimator variables (those outside the control of the criminal justice system such as those to do with the witness and the characteristics of the crime e.g. lighting levels, distance of the witness from the action) and system variables (those under the control of the criminal justice system such as the nature of the line-ups and questioning). Wagenaar and van der Schrier (1996) suggested a Rule of 15 which states that for accuracy the limits are 15m and 15 lux. Even in ideal circumstances, Flin and Shepherd (1986) found that there was a tendency to underestimate above average characteristics and over estimate below average ones i.e. there was a tendency to average out. Cutler (1987) found that the presence of a weapon reduced the accuracy of identification still further. To improve accuracy, sequential line-ups can be used and specific instructions rather than just asking who it is (Cutler et al., 1987).

University.
Chapter 4 *Language, thought and culture* runs to about 50 pages and is one of the optional chapters on the first TMA.

### Learning outcomes
**TO BE INCLUDED**

#### Introduction
This is a very brief introduction to what is to follow in the chapter, touching on the concept of language, moving on to concepts and the idea that the speakers of different languages actually think differently and some difficulties in the use of language in experiments.

**What is language?** Aitchison (2008) points out that all normal human beings speak and that we have come to consider language as something that only humans do. However, Clarke (2006) found that gibbons in Thailand also employ a form of speech, albeit a somewhat simpler one than typical human languages. Clearly English has a great deal more vocabulary than the gibbon language but it also has a grammar which non-human languages don’t (Sampson, 2009). Aitchison (2008) identifies a range of characteristics which languages possess: 1) a *vocal-auditory channel* (although other channels can be used e.g. braille uses touch), 2) it is *arbitrary* i.e. the symbol used to represent an object does not resemble the object, 3) it has a *semanticity* i.e. the symbols used are generalisable e.g. we can refer to a specific dog or dogs in general, 4) *spontaneous usage*, 5) we employ *turn-taking*, 6) it has a *duality* thus the letters in *dog* only form the symbol for dog when combined, 7) human languages use *cultural transmission* i.e. we must learn languages whereas birds develop songs even when raised in isolation (not an experiment that would get ethical approval with humans!), 8) we can use *displacement* i.e. talk about things that aren’t happening here and now, finally 9) *structure-dependence*, 10) *creativity* and 11) we can *mind-read* are all considered human-only language features. Chomsky (1957) in particular stressed the structure-dependence (i.e. grammar) aspect and noted that it is easy to produce grammatically correct but nonsense sentences and also that many of our sentences are unique. The ability to anticipate intentions isn’t entirely limited to humans as Tomasello (2010) highlighted with his example of chimpanzees passing food to humans but noted that they don’t tend to form joint goals. Warneken (2006) demonstrated that toddlers and human-raised chimpanzees would co-operate in goal directed activities but the chimpanzees did not participate in social games without a goal in mind and moreover did not attempt to re-engage the humans who had withdrawn from the activities.

**What are concepts made of?** Introduces the idea of concepts as mental categories which have a series of attributes which are necessary and sufficient. In particular in this classical view, anything having those attributes is just as good an example of the category as any other thing with those attributes. **Prototype theory** takes Rosch’s (1973) idea that some exemplars are better examples of the concept than others e.g. an orangey-red isn’t as *good* an example of *red* as a “proper red” and similarly some fruits are better examples of fruits than others e.g. an apple is a better examplar than an olive. As always, the experiment had some limitations, in particular what does it mean to be a *good* example? Did that just mean to some participants how enjoyable it was rather than how typical it was? Also *apple* is a much more commonly used word (“A is for Apple”)… though Mervis (1976) ruled this out. Other typicality effects such as the estimation of the chance of a cross-species infection have been found (Rips, 1975) and Mervis (1980) found that children acquire vocabulary in order of typicality. Why this typicality effect exists was found to the more typical exemplars having more features of the category e.g. a robin is clearly a
more typical bird than an ostrich and less typical exemplars overlap with other categories (e.g. bats aren’t great examples of mammals) (Rosch and Mervis, 1975). The best examples of a category are called prototypical exemplars and have all the required attributes but none of those from other categories. Kurbat’s 1994 study using images showed that typicality wasn’t confined to words and meanings and Kempton illustrated the cultural differences in prototypes using boots finding army boots worked in the UK and cowboy boots worked in the US. The knowledge approach Murphy’s knowledge approach (2004) contrasts with Roche’s prototype theory in considering that concepts are richer than simple dictionary definitions. Barsalou (1983) illustrated this by using ad hoc categories such as “ways to avoid being killed by the Mafia”. Stanfield and Zwann (2001) found that the concepts had other properties so that sentences with nails hammered into walls got a swifter response when the nail illustration was horizontal than when it was vertical i.e. the orientation of the nail was part of the concept of something being hammered into a wall. Hampton (1987) found that there was feature cancellation so that in asking for pets that are also birds, migration wasn’t mentioned as a property. Fodor (1998) noted that prototype theory implies that a prototypical pet fish should be cuddly as prototypical pets are. Conceptual combination was investigated by Keil (2000) who found that emergent features were associated with phrases but not to the underlying words e.g. arctic bicycles had spiked tyres yet neither arctic nor bicycle had. The knowledge vs typicality argument was found by Proffitt (2000) where tree experts estimated the likelihood of a disease being transmitted between species whereas Rips (1975) found in non-experts it was typicality that dominated in estimations of transmission of bird disease, as one would expect. Smith and Sloman (1994) found that knowledge was used when the participants had to give reasons for their choices.

Do speakers of different languages think differently? Introduces the idea that the language which we use to speak influences, but does not determine, what we can think. Language effects on colour discrimination considers whether the words that we have in our language for colours influences the colours we can see e.g. Russian has words for blue and light blue comparable to the English red and pink. Franklin (2005) considers that the colours are hard-wired whereas Goldstein (2009) considers that they are influenced by the language that we use. For example, Himba doesn’t have words for blue and green. As it turns out, Goldstein (2009) found that they could distinguish them but at the blue-purple and green-blue ranges they behaved like English children who didn’t know the names for the colours although there are issues around the environment in which they are raised: Himba are in a desert with limited colour range whilst the English children see all kinds of colours. Winawer (2007) found an advantage for Russian speakers in distinguishing light-blue from dark-blue (for which they have different words) over English speakers. Language effects on more abstract concepts considers whether this colour effect can be extended to more abstract concepts such as time. This goes into some detail on the experiments that Boroditsky (2001, 2011) conducted to examine Mandarin and English speakers way of thinking about time (vertically vs horizontally) and found that there are differences but this could be a function of experience rather than a function of language experience.

Does perception influence thought? Does language experience affect cognition or is it that language arises out of the perceptual experience? Barsalou (1999) went even further, suggesting that the cognition is accompanied by the experience e.g. if you think of the word “up” then the areas of your brain carrying out the actions are also activated i.e the cognition is embodied. Traditionally cognition is regarded as abstract i.e. disembodied (Kaye, 2010). This has transducers translating into a domain-specific modality (audio,
visual, etc.) and then an amodal central processing function. There is evidence that the embodied (i.e. grounded in physical experience) is the way that it works (e.g. egg and chips vs chicken and egg). Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) used an ‘action-sentence compatibility effect’ to demonstrate this e.g. ‘Joe sang the cards to you’ doesn’t make sense whereas ‘You gave the earring to Susan’ does. Borghi et al. (2004) used an inside/outside metaphor e.g. fuelling the car (outside), driving the car (inside) using probe words such as tyre and steering wheel, it being easier when the word matched the location (i.e. fuelling the car going with tyre); this also worked with shapes e.g. flat palm went with smoothing the table cloth.

Chapter 5 *Developmental psychology: cognitive development and epistemologies* runs to around 40 pages and is one of the chapters for TMA3. It will have a fairly familiar feel for anyone who has done one of the child development modules.

Learning outcomes TO BE INCLUDED

**Introduction** gives a very brief overview of how diverse the fields of study are in developmental psychology and equally how diverse the methods used are.

**Piagetian and Vygotskian perspectives on cognitive development.** A Piagetian perspective introduces Piaget’s constructivist approach built on the idea that children construct their understanding of the world by way of developing schemas and take place over a number of stages in their lives. So, we have from 1-4 months *primary circular reactions* (i.e. repetitive motions centred on themselves), from 4-8 months *secondary circular motions* (i.e. repetitive motions with effects away from their body) and from 12-18 months *tertiary circular reactions* which are experimental in nature. His theory is based on the idea that all children in all cultures will process through a series of stages in their lives: birth to 2 years *sensorimotor* (developing object permanence), 2-7 years *preoperational* (use of language to represent objects), 7-11 years *concrete operational* (logical reasoning, mastering conservation), 11-18 years *formal operational* (logical thought applied to abstract ideas). This implies that play is an important element in development although the relationship between play and guided play differs between cultures. Criticism of this approach comes from many angles in particular that individual children can be at different stages in different domains at any given point in their lives. **Piagetian methods** illustrates the development of his ideas through his work with Binet on IQ scales where he was interested in the errors that children made and in particular the systematic way in which this happened. He noted that children weren’t miniature adults and emphasised the idea that children needed to be allowed to talk freely in research, avoiding too many questions but rather allowing them to elaborate on their thinking: moving towards open-ended questions and semi-structured interviews. His three mountains task (Piaget, 1969) illustrated the egocentric nature of children and is difficult for 4-5 year olds but easy enough at 9-10. Other tasks were around conservation of mass, volume and number which proved difficult before around 7 (i.e. at preoperational stage) as are class inclusion problems (e.g. are there more red flowers or more flowers in a bunch of red and yellow flowers)(Goswami, 2014). He didn’t consider the effects of peers and the social situation on learning until much later nor did he consider the human sense aspect (e.g. hiding from a policeman variant of the three mountains task and similar variants of the conservation tasks [Donaldson, 1983]). **A Vygotskian perspective** takes a social-constructivist approach developing using the concept of the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) and scaffolding of learning: cultural tools together with social interaction produce the skills and abilities that we see. **Vygotskian methods** presented problems for children to solve but with the addition of cues e.g. The blocks test asks children to sort blocks into categories with odd names and observes how they develop the meaning of the categorisation. Children’s self-talk explores how Vygotsky saw the disappearance of self-talk around 4-7 represented the internalisation of the concepts. This generally reappears when difficult tasks are encountered even later in life (Smith, 2007). **Social-constructivist interventions** Looking at talk within classrooms, Lyle (2008) noted that 90% of it consisted of closed responses in the *Initiate, Response, Feedback* pattern. Mercer (1995) considered the types of interactions that were used, with Warwick (2013) finding that exploratory talk was the most useful. Mercer (2014) went on to develop interventions
aiming to teach the styles of speech that were required to develop collaborative working. Mercer (2006) found that these interventions improved their performance over a range of topic areas i.e. as Vygotsky would have it, developing their social skills affected their thinking skills more generally.

**Measuring beliefs about epistemology** begins by highlighting the teachers’s beliefs about epistemology affect how they teach. Thus a Piagetian approach will assume that children develop in set stages whilst a Vygotskyian one will emphasise social learning. Self-report questionnaires are generally used to explore the impact of these beliefs. **Self-report questionnaires** are developed starting from a literature review before a pilot then moving on to factor analysis. Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) (Schommer, 1990) used a Likert scale on a range of questions such as ‘Successful students understand things quickly.’ From this, the factor analysis came up with four factors with good reliability: **Fixed ability, Simple knowledge, Quick learning and Certain knowledge**. Hofer’s Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire (EBQ) groups the factors into the nature of knowing *(what knowledge is: the certainty and simplicity of knowledge)* and the process of knowing *(how you come to understand knowledge: the source and justification of knowledge).* Erdamar and Alpan (2013) used this to consider the belief systems: fixed and certain, coming from authority figures through to complex and the need to put effort into learning. However, Schraw (2013) found that the EQ didn’t cover everything and seemed to be and went on to develop Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) to address the shortcomings. Others such as Tümkaya (2012) have gone on to add demographic and personal details producing a three factor model: ‘the belief concerning that learning depends on effort’, ‘the belief concerning that learning depends on ability’, and ‘the belief concerning that there is one unchanging truth’. As always, there is a cultural element to this and Chi-Kin Lee (2013) using EQ in China found an authority/expert factor not in the original EQ. What is culture though? Tümkaya (2012) considered university students from different faculties finding that social science students emphasised the importance of learning on effort and context whilst medical students emphasised innate ability. **The case of inclusive education** introduces the idea of key word signing as a way of supporting the communication skills of those with severe learning difficulties e.g. the use of Signalong which is based on British Sign Language. This is key word signing rather than a fully developed sign language. Some evidence suggests that a social-constructivist approach works best in inclusive class rooms (Mercer, 2009) which in turn implies that those teachers would have an epistemology of social-constructivism but few studies have considered this (Florian and Black-Hawkins, 2011). Sheehy and Budianto (2014) considered this in Indonesia (mainly on the videos). Pompeo (2011) indicated that reflecting on one’s epistemological beliefs can help improve them and hence social science students tend to be more sophisticated in terms of epistemology than science students.

Chapter 6 Measuring differences in people: creativity and personality runs to about 35 pages and is the second of the chapters for TMA3.

Learning outcomes
TO BE INCLUDED

**Introduction** points out the emphasis on creativity and the measurement of it by way surveys.

**Creativity** starts with defining creativity as the ability to create something novel and appropriate. (Sternberg and Lubart, 1999), noting that link to usefulness. Richards (1999) broke it down into person, product, process and press.

**Reliability and validity** points out the need for measures to be both reliable (i.e. consistent) and to be valid (i.e. to measure what they should be measuring).

**Assessing creativity** introduces the range of tests of creativity. **Divergent thinking tests** consider the ability to generate a wide range of ideas but don’t particularly measure creativity per se (Kaufman et al., 2008). They are based on Guilford’s Structure of Intellect model (Guilford, 1967) who argued that creativity was defined as the ability to create a wide range of ideas: such a person must be more creative than one who can only generate a small number of ideas. The tests themselves included those based on writing, drawing, and event consequences but the most popular is the unusual uses test e.g. think of ways to use a brick. The most commonly used of this type of test is Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT; e.g. Torrance, 1974) which comes in verbal and visual versions. These measure the **fluency** (number of different ideas), **flexibility** (number of different categories), **originality** (the rarity of the ideas) and **elaboration** (how detailed they are). There are issues with cross-relevance of these scores e.g. high fluency can impact on the flexibility and originality as there are simply more ideas to count which some have tried to allow for (Snyder et al., 2004). Although not a direct measure of creativity divergent thinking is an important aspect of it (Runco, 2004). **Remote Associates Test** is the idea that being able to link ideas from disparate sources is a consequence of creativity (Mednick, 1962). His test presents participants with sets of three words and asks them to come up with the word that links them e.g. blood, music, cheese (blue). The test has good reliability (Mednick, 1963) but the validity has been questioned e.g. it is related to academic achievement, verbal IQ and speed (Taft and Rossiter, 1966) and it has been argued that it’s a measure of convergent thinking (Brophy, 2000–2001). **Insight problems** can be measured by the remote associates test. Wallas (1926) came up with four stages in the insight process: preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification e.g. the nine dot problem. Bowden et al. (2005) pointed out the lack of reliability caused by the difficulty in some of the tasks. **Self-report measures** attempt to address the lack of ecological validity of the earlier tests. They work on the basis that past creativity is a guide to future creative potential. Creative Activities Questionnaire (CAQ) (Carson et al., 2005) queries achievements in each of ten domains with ability ranging from I know nothing about this through to my work has been reviewed in national publications. It related well to divergent thinking tests. Somewhat shorter (23 items) is Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale (RIBS; Runco et al., 2000–2001) which has scales such as I have wild ideas through to I can’t sleep at night because of the number of ideas I have. Kaufman et al. (2008) points out the obvious downsides of self-report i.e. that they are inconsistent and people lie. **Consensual Assessment Technique** uses consensus as the judge e.g. Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT) (Amabile, 1982, 1996) gives people a task, administers it consistently,
selects suitable judges, has them independently rate the creation and analyses the results. It has high reliability and seems to validly measure creativity (with correlation to the unusual uses divergent thinking tests). **Historiometry** uses historical records looking at 1) general rules across people, places and eras, 2) quantitative analyses and 3) large samples. Lehman (1953) found that creativity rises to a peak and then declines with the timing of the peak varying according to the field of endeavour. However, it’s an old study and relying on the judgement of historians as he did biased the results to the more recent past and there’s obviously survivor bias (Dennis, 1956). Interestingly, the creative peak is related to the length of time in that career rather than actual age Simonton (e.g. 1997).

**Creativity and personality** have been studied together for a long time in various guises (Runco, 2004). The **trait approach** has moved on from earlier categorical approaches thus we no longer consider someone as simply an extrovert but rather that they have a high score on the extroversion dimension. These approaches generally start with a factor analysis so Cattell (e.g. 1957) ended up with his 16PF which started from some 4500 traits. **Factor analysis** itself is a multivariate statistical analysis process that is used to pull out patterns in the data and group highly correlated items so, for example, you’d have a group of items related to extroversion such as ‘life and soul of the party’, ‘making friends easily’, etc. However, there is no agreement on the set of traits so Eysenck (1990) ended up with just three, OCEAN (openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism) with the Big Five (Goldberg, 1981). Costa and McCrae (1992) moved the Big Five on a bit with NEO-PI-R and each into six facets. Ashton et al. (2000) added trustworthiness as a sixth factor in HEXACO (Honesty-humility; Emotionality; eXtraversion; Agreeableness; Conscientiousness; Openness to experience). It’s suggested that there may be an underlying evolutionary basis to these (Ashton and Lee, 2007). **The relationship between creativity and personality** considers what traits might be most related to creativity with Barron and Harrington (1981) weighing in with ‘High valuation of aesthetic qualities, broad interests, attraction to complexity, high energy, independence of judgement, autonomy, intuition, self-confidence, ability to solve antimonies or to accommodate apparently opposite or conflicting traits in one’s self-concept, and, finally, a firm sense of self as “creative’. In relation to the Big Five, openness is considered to be the most relevant (Furnham, 1999) with extraversion following close behind (Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham, 2005) and neuroticism trailing. There are differences in the various creative fields though with conscientiousness being important in science BUT more creative scientists and artists tended to be less conscientious Feist (1998, 1999) and generally having more of the creative traits that you’d expect e.g. less conventional, more driven, more self-confident, etc. **Creativity and abnormal behaviour** considers whether there is a real mad-scientist effect as Eysenck (1993, 1995) argued in linking creativity and psychoticsim. Although some studies have found a link (Götz and Götz, 1979; Merten and Fischer, 1999; Zabelina et al., 2014), others haven’t (Aguilar-Alonso, 1996). Although schizotypy has been found to be related (Fisher et al., 2004), schizophrenia itself hasn’t been (Lauronen et al., 2004). But affective disorders like bipolar have been found to have a link to creativity (Lauronen et al., 2004). So Eysenck may have been right to link psychoticsim to creativity (Zabelina et al., 2014). There is inconsistency in the studies as some consider quite small populations.

**What next?** The ‘dark side’ of creativity and personality considers whether negative acts are creative e.g. is an ingenious crime creative? Studying real-life examples obviously poses problems but Lee and Dow (2011) considered the brick but counting the negative examples that they generated and found the obvious link between having a physical aggressive trait led to more negative creative uses. There are many other scenario based
studies such as getting back at someone damaging your property (Harris and Reiter-Palmon, 2015) or just rating scenarios (Cropley et al., 2014). Gino and Ariely (2012) studied the link between creativity and dishonesty in an experiment aimed at encouraging dishonesty which did indeed find a link essentially because creative individuals consider more options, including the dishonest ones. Gino and Wiltermuth (2014) also found that being dishonest enhanced creativity too. Paulhus and Williams (2002) identified the Dark Triad of Machiavellianism, narcissism and psychopathy and a range of surveys have been developed to explore this e.g. Dirty Dozen (Jonason and Webster, 2010) and Short Dark Triad (SD3; Jones and Paulhus, 2014). It has been linked to bad bosses/toxic leaders (O’Boyle et al., 2012) but equally can be useful to get ahead and be successful (Hogan and Hogan, 2001). There are obviously links to internet trolls and criminal behaviour with Machiavellians more likely to undertake white collar crime. Buckels et al., 2013; Paulhus, 2014 have called for sadism to be added to the triad. Goncalo et al. (2010) found that although narcissists gave themselves higher creative ratings (well, they would, wouldn’t they?), they weren’t actually any more creative. However, they did find that when a narcissist pitched an idea to others, they were judged to be more creative (essentially they sold their idea better). Kapoor (2015) offered a choice of positive, negative and neutral creative options in an experiment and found that narcissism tended to go for the positive solution, psychoticism for negative but Machiavellianism wasn’t predictive.

Chapter 7 Why use text-based qualitative methodologies? The phenomenology and social construction of jealousy runs to about 35 pages and is one of the optional chapters in TMA4.

**Introduction** starts with an extended quote highlighting the subjective nature of jealousy before going on to remind us of Harré’s person (P) grammar and molecule (M) grammar from chapter 1 and how they have developed into a social science approach to psychology distinguished from the qualitative approach of this and subsequent chapters which take a more holistic view of the person set in their social contexts. This chapter looks in particular at phenomenology which comes from a philosophical background by way of Brentano in the 19th century, several authors around then, and on to Luckmann (1966) with his synthesis of continental phenomenology and anglo-american social science traditions. They then pull out ten aspects from the initial quotation: 1) language (i.e. discourse), 2) experience (of the narrator in this case), 3) relationships with people, 4) power and desire, 5) relationships with objects, 6) space and place, 7) imagery, 8) temporality, 9) meaning and 10) embodiment, which you will recognise from DSE212 (chapter 1) and DD307 (book 1 chapter 8). Heidegger (1966) picked on the aspect of being in the world to emphasise that we are always operating in a social context and that our lifeworld is experienced in a lived space and lived time. This construction of reality by each of us is in contrast to the scientific approach with experimentation (Ashworth, 2003). Discourse analysis takes a further step back and considers that the discourse is the reality.

**Stepping back from ordinary experience: the objectivity of natural science** considers why this stepping back might be valid and starts by pointing out that natural sciences tend to look only at external features. This causes problems in psychology in, for example, describing emotions although doing so led Skinner (1953) to suggest abandoning emotion as a topic for study. Others considered looking at the effects on the limbic system thus dragging it back to science e.g. by observing how emotions are expressed (Darwin, 1872), the bodily changes (James, 1884) or the effect of the limbic system (Cannon, 1929) [see DD307 chapter 6]. However, there’s still no consensus on what emotion is (Frijda and Scherer, 2009). The problem is that science steps back from what Husserl called the natural attitude i.e. the common sense way of explaining things. A critique of naturalistic objectivism applied to jealousy starts off by pointing out that whilst science considers emotions as things which are measurable from the outside, we actually experience them as personal things (Stenner, 2015). Essentially the sciences take a reductionist approach, considering them as objective rather than as subjective. This has the particular disadvantage that it makes the more difficult emotions (e.g. jealousy) more difficult to study and therefore less studied (Sabini and Silver, 2005). Essentially it forces the assignment of, say, jealousy to a variable with a value e.g. ‘how jealous are you?’ (Elphinston et al., 2011). Buss (1992) tried to do this through a minimalistic definition of jealousy by, for example, asking participants to state whether their partner developing a deep emotional bond with them was worse than them having passionate intercourse but it has not, yet, proved possible to replicate his results. Using measurements of pulse rates he came to the conclusion that males found the passionate sex choice more disturbing than the emotional bond option which is considered to be one of the strongest of gender differences (Oliver and Hyde, 1993) but one that is expected to narrow (Petersen and Hyde, 2010). The male distress is thought to be due to the double dose of sex plus emotional bonding (DeSteno and Salovey, 1996 and Harris and Christenfeld, 1996). The measurement of arousal (i.e. higher pulse rate etc.) causes problems as it may be that males just get more aroused thinking about sex (Harris, 2000) i.e. it’s not so much the scenario presented but the thinking about sex that it kicks off. Another issue is that the results are not consistent and
can even reverse with age (Harris, 2000). In short, there are issues with the reductionist approach.

Stepping into experience: the core methodological concepts of phenomenology introduces the idea of keeping the person in context and the four core ideas of phenomenology: natural attitude, epoché, intentionality and lifeworld. The natural attitude is the way in which we consider our experiences of the outside world to be the reality of it (Husserl). Epoché is the stepping back or bracketing of our natural attitude to concentrate on experience. Intentionality is the studying of experience in relation to the objects which are part of that experience i.e. what one’s memory is about. Lifeworld is the world that is constructed through experience.

The intentionality of experiences we call ‘jealousy’ and their relation to a lifeworld gets quite quickly into philosophical argument converting the jealousy triangle of object of desire, rival and subject into algebra before going on to point out that the idea of jealousy that Buss had was very different. Methodological implications starts off by pointing out that there is a long history of using qualitative methods (e.g. MacLeod, 1947) with today a families of descriptive (e.g. Giorgi, 2000) and interpretative approaches (e.g. Manen, 1990) before going on to list six features that they have in common: 1) they study lived experience, 2) they collect accounts of experience and study their own experiences, 3) they start with descriptions before trying to explain, 4) they consider that it’s only possible to generalise through familiarity, 5) interpretation is central and 6) the experience must be part of the lifeworld.

Stepping into discourse: a brief overview of the social-constructionist underpinnings of discursive psychology. Introducing discursive psychology starts by defining this approach as one that ‘takes the action orientated and reality-constructing features of discourse as fundamental’ (Potter and Edwards, 2001). It is an approach that considers how language constructs experience (Wetherell, 2012), essentially language is the reality. Their analyses consider constructions, variations and functions within language and the performance aspect of it (e.g. Austin, 1962). For example, the words that we utter are often to perform social actions such as telling a boss that one is stress in reality being to provide a reason for not having completed a task. Jealousy and discourse starts by pointing out that we cannot know what someone else actually feels but are rather depending on a translation of their feelings into language. Thus jealousy is quite different for a married couple than it would be for swingers (i.e. for the one, it is negative, for the other it is positive) (De Visser and McDonald, 2007). Discursive psychology isn’t interested in the experience so much as the way in which it is constructed through language (Morgan et al., 1997). For example, Daly et al., (1982) consider that jealousy is a natural phenomena that allows men to control women. Others consider that this construction is merely excusing their actions (Stenner, 1993). Discursive psychology takes a step back and asks what function jealousy performs in these constructions.

Dialects of discursive psychology and methodological implications considers some variations of discursive psychology such as conversation analysis (Drew, 2003), the discourse of psychiatry (Willig, 2003), critical discursive psychology (Wetherell, 1998) before going on to point out that you just need some analytical tools such as Death and furniture: reflections on realism and relativism. Why you might want to use discursive methods include: Theoretical reasons: re-specifying the nature of psychological constructs (e.g. Edwards and Potter, 1992), Practical reasons: training solutions for professionals (e.g. Stokoe, 2014), and Political and ideological reasons (e.g. Wetherell and Potter,
Chapter 8 Why focus on experience? Introducing phenomenological psychology runs to about 30 pages and is the second of the four optional chapters for TMA4. It’s also covered in chapter 5 of book 1 in DD307.

Introduction starts off with an extended quotation from Finlay and Eatough (2012) describing what meeting a kindred spirit feels like from the inside before going on to explain that phenomenology is all about trying to make sense of the lived experience of someone else rather than trying to fit them into a theoretical model (Langdridge, 2007).

Relationship formation: epoché and the phenomenological reduction introduces the idea that relationships are a major topic of investigation (Duck, 2012) and with that the aspects of attraction and how that is changing with internet and app dating (Finkel and Eastwick, 2015) introducing Finkel and Eastwick’s framework based on the idea that attraction depends on others providing for some of our own needs: domain-general perspectives are the basic building blocks (e.g. pleasure, belonging, etc.) that can be addressed by friendship or romantic relationships, domain-specific evolutionary perspectives are those based on fundamental evolutionary needs i.e. the need to reproduce, and attachment perspectives which are driven by the need for attachment (Bowlby, 1969). Their argument is that attraction is based on instrumentality i.e. that it is a means to an end. However, as usual, this is based on studies of American undergraduate students and moreover assumed instrumentality from the outset and they didn’t focus on the experience itself as phenomenology does. Importantly, phenomenology prioritises description over than a theoretical framework and in their study Finlay and Eatough (2012) which analysed the detailed responses of 24 participants of kindred spirit interactions came up with five facets bonding; fellowship; destiny; chemistry; and love each of which spills over into the others and all of them embedded in the mind, soul and body (diagram p357) thus indicating that the kindred spirit feeling is not a simple one. The epoché introduces the idea of setting aside any pre-conceptions about the object of the study, notably including any theoretical frameworks i.e. it begins with a pure description through the phenomenological reduction (Husserl, 2012) which explicitly sets aside any abstraction, theorising and generalisation that would ordinarily be carried in other fields in psychology. This is done in two stages: 1) setting aside the existing theories in the field of study and 2) moves on from considering what exists to how the phenomena exists in the lifeworld of the participant through consideration of emerging themes within their descriptions. This process of description is a horizontalised one i.e. every idea is given equal priority e.g. someone’s cat dying should be treated as equally important to their mother dying, until the different meanings are confirmed and subject to constant verification Ihde (1986). The aim is to have a God’s eye-view (Heidegger, 1962) i.e. one with no biases from the researcher in it, to have an understanding of the world of the participant from their perspective. Data collection for phenomenological research generally uses a written protocol (i.e. send out a form for completion), interviews (semi-structured or unstructured) and less commonly focus groups and existing texts.

Emotions within a relational context: illustrating the dimensions of the lifeworld introduced the topic of love as being an ideal subject for phenomenological study, noting that it is very much bound to a context with, for example, it not being an essential component in the western world in the middle ages and more a binding of families then as it is now in a number of societies (Beall and Sternberg,1995). This section focuses on jealousy as being one of the more difficult to deal with emotions (Duck, 2012) and in particular considers romantic jealousy (Langdridge, et al., 2012). This research used memory work (examining a common experience via the researchers’ own memories)
(Haug, 1987; Willig, 2001) and by way of a phenomenological approach identified disruptor moments where one’s view of the relationship was changed through the intervention of a third party thus creating the jealousy. This is in contrast to earlier research which indicated that there might be a predisposition to jealousy (Pines, 1998). Key to phenomenological analysis are aspects of the lifeworld i.e. temporaity: phenomenological time vs clock time, spaciality: our place in the world and relationship to the objects within it (e.g. agoraphobia), sociality (intersubjectivity): our relationships with others, and embodiment: the body as subject.

See interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) section p368.

The loss of a relationship and the grieving process: the value of phenomenology in rethinking the taken for granted points out that there has been a lot of research on the impact of the loss of a partner and the grieving process itself (Neimeyer, 2005; Stroebe and Stroebe, 1987). Kübler-Ross (1969) proposed a five stage model: denial and isolation, anger, negotiation, depression (e.g. self-blame), and acceptance (looking to the future). But a) grief is complex and b) acceptance/close is problematic (Stroebe et al., 2008). One particular problem is that the stage model is so ingrained that it has, to an extent, constructed itself. A Danish study of men’s approach to grief (Elklit and Jind, 1999) found that they found it harder to deal with. The interpretive (hermeneutic) model used in the study consists of a series of elements: 1) Turn to the phenomenon and commit to it. 2) Investigate experience as lived (rather than conceptually). 3) Reflect on the essential themes that characterise the phenomenon through the dimensions of the lifeworld. 4) Describe the phenomenon through writing. 5) Maintain a strong and oriented disciplinary relation to the phenomenon. 6) Balance the research context by examining parts and whole. Following the transcription of the semi-structured interviews Van Manen’s (1990) three stage approach to analysis was used: 1) holistic reading, 2) selective reading of essential passages and 3) detailed reading of the whole text. This resulted in three themes: (1) grief and self-reflection; (2) meaning of life and loss; and (3) re-figuring the lifeworld.

Introduction highlights that the chapter first introduces the theory of discursive psychology in micro and macro contexts in the construction of identity before moving on to use it in a worked example dealing with ADHD.

Discursive psychology and the construction of identity introduces the idea of identity as being a theory of ourselves constructed through 1) inner concepts as expressed through how we talk, think and feel about ourselves, 2) outer concepts as expressed through how others see us and talk about us, and 3) contextual constructs that are available to us through our culture and history. However, we are not entirely free in our constructions as what we say we are is constrained by what others say we can be (Johnston, 1973). Following on from this are 1) identity is more what you do and have done to you rather than what you are i.e. it is a social construction. 2) it is fluid rather than fixed. And 3) there is an aspect of power relations in terms of being able to challenge one’s identity within society e.g. feminism’s challenge of women’s identities. Throughout all this, one’s identity can be in a state of flux e.g. when changing one’s role in some aspect thus creating a sense of discontinuity. The descriptions of identity itself went through this kind of discontinuity in moving from being considered an expression of unique and personal beliefs (Davies and Harré, 1990) to ‘noisy, dialogical and distributed’ (Wetherell, 2007) and being a social construction (Benwell and Stokoe, 2011). Discursive psychologists look at how variations in reality are constructed through language and what the functions of the various components of the language used perform. Micro and macro approaches introduces the micro approach as a bottom-up one which concentrates on the data, requiring detailed transcription. For example, in Stokoe’s (2003, 2009) transcription the participant identifies as a ‘single mother’ rather than a ‘mother’ thus invoking a range of common knowledge associated with the category of ‘single mother’ e.g. limited resources, no sharing of responsibilities, etc. Stokoe also notes that there is a hierarchy of categories with the standardised relational pair (SRP) of mother and father being considered superior to that of single mother. The macro level deriving from Foucault, considers what can be said with a given historical period e.g. the concept of madness is clearly quite different when it came with a label of sinner than when it came with one of patient (Foucault, 2003, 2006). A blended approach considers an approach in the middle-ground (Benwell and Stokoe, 2011) developing from Potter and Wetherell (1987) in the form of Critical Discursive Psychology (CDP). This considers both the fine detail and the cultural context surrounding it. Interpretative repertoires are a way of analysing discourses by way of a consistent and recurrent set of language features including figures of speech, grammatical constructions (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Thus an ‘empiricist repertoire’ diminishes the subjective aspects of speech whereas a ‘contingent repertoire’ as used in interviews contains a good deal more subjective language (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). For example, Silverman (2001) identifies a mother of a teenager as using repertoires of ‘parental responsibility’ and ‘autonomy of young adults’ in a doctor’s consultation thus presenting two different identities (Davies and Harré, 1990) or subject positions. Subject positions is another idea from CDP which constructs an identity or subject position. Seymour-Smith (2008) notes that individuals will have a range of positions which they employ in different contexts. Callaghan and Lazard (2012) took the example of breast-feeding to illustrate how those who didn’t breast-feed constructed their decision as a responsible one, rejecting the position that not breast-feeding = ‘irresponsible mother’.

Identity, discourse and medical categories notes that medical diagnoses are, at least...
partially, social constructions and illustrates this through the varying definitions of what ADHD is, ranging from hyperkinesis, through to hyperactivity Horton-Salway (2011). More generally, medical definitions are not static but subject to refinement as new knowledge becomes available (Hall, 2001) and are therefore socially created (Tait, 2001) as society changes and reinterprets childhood behaviour (Timimi, 2007; Singh, 2008b). Current understandings of ADHD Although guidelines have been issued (NICE, 2008) and it is a recognised category (APA, 2013), there is still debate around medical approaches and psychological interventions: is it 1) a biological problem, 2) an environmental one caused by poor parenting or 3) just an excuse for naughty children? The research questions considers ADHD through discourse analysis in two studies (Horton-Salway, 2011, 2013; Davies, 2014). Horton-Salway (2011, 2013) looked at existing texts with the questions ‘How has ADHD been represented in UK national newspapers over the period 2000–2009?’ and ‘How are gendered social identities implicated in representations of ADHD in the UK national newspapers over the period 2009–2011?’ while Davies (2014) used focus groups and interviews using the questions ‘How do parents talk about their experiences of ADHD?’ and ‘How, through discursive action, do parents construct their identities in relation to the meaning of ADHD?’. A discursive approach reminds us that identities have a function, are variable and are affected by power and that discourse has a function of constructing variability. CDP serves to make the various features of the language used transparent thus enabling them to be challenged; the key features of CDP are 1) Examine what is said, 2) Identify key interpretative repertoires, 3) Examine the function of the talk, 4) What is being taken for granted in the discourse?, and 5) Consider the variability of accounts. Davies (2014) used semi-structured and discussion groups Examining what is said Repeated topics were found by both researchers from their bottom-up approach. Identifying interpretative repertoires: looking for patterns in data Davies noted that parents explained ADHD as a biological problem but recognised that others attributed it to bad parenting and similarly Horton-Salway identified ways of describing it in articles as using either biological repertoires or psychosocial repertoires. Typically biological repertoires seek medical solutions whereas psychosocial repertoires consider it as due to dysfunctional families. Identifying subject positions uses several examples to illustrate how parents create subject positions of good parent doing all the right things yet having a child with ADHD, contrasting this with a newspaper report talking of poor parenting creating a generation of dysfunctional children. Taken-for-granted identities, inequality and power relations considers the medicalisation of ADHD, noting that more boys are referred for medical treatment, possibly because it presents as hyperactivity whereas in girls it tends to present as inattentiveness. However, Conrad and Potter (2000) suggest that it may be medicalising what would previously have been called boisterousness’. Both researchers found that there was an emphasis on boys and their mothers with fathers being under-represented and in particular naughty boys with the mothers to blame (Singh, 2002, 2004; Blum, 2007). In general, fathers were considered to be the ‘junior parent’. Function, variability and inconsistency Notes that the parents interviewed generally considered themselves to be good parents but with a child with a medical issue but that there might be an aspect of bad parenting in other parents; variations of this were noted in the discourses used as examples: discourse isn’t always consistent (Billig et al., 1988). Horton-Salway (2011, 2013) noted that parents seeking a medical solution were not considered to be putting the child’s interest at heart and as Gray (2008) points out the medication is of more use to the parents and teachers than it is to the child. However, there are several ways of looking at this: 1) seeking medication as a solution is just a cop-out, 2) not seeking a diagnosis is neglect and 3) the medication can be used as a cosh – in effect there is no way to win. To get around this, Davies notes that some parents stated an initial reluctance about medication (to highlight their ‘good parent’ credentials) before they
went down that route.

Chapter 10 Memory and remembering in autobiographical talk runs to about 35 pages and is the fourth of the optional chapters in TMA4. This is the final chapter of the first book, the second book having one chapter for each of the three methodological approaches allowed for the project.

Introduction starts off with a lengthy quote from Edwards (1997) showing the detailed level of transcription that he used in his analysis of what function autobiographical talk performed. The aspects that are covered in the chapter are narrative, troubles and dilemmas (Taylor, 2010) and takes a discursive approach to memory and its relation to identity.

A discursive approach to remembering and autobiographical talk Notes that autobiographical memory is simply memory pertaining to one’s own life. The sense of autobiography here isn’t the story of lives (i.e. as in an autobiographical book) but rather the stories from lives (i.e. snippets from a life). The interest isn’t so much in the accuracy of the recollection but rather in the construction of the story (Young, 1989). In general, we select aspects that are in keeping with our view of ourselves thus the memories are always reconstructions and aren’t entirely right nor entirely wrong Conway (2005). Moreover, there is always a social aspect to the reconstructions: a sharing of the memory (Brown and Reavey, 2015). Discursive psychologists bracket out the underlying reality and consider only the reality as constructed through the discourse itself with the analyses considering both the function carried out through the discourse and the shared understandings upon which the discourse is based. The bracketing in this case brackets out both the issue as to whether or not the story is true but also the issue of how it was experienced thereby considering 1) the construction of the discourse, 2) the setting of these constructions in their social context and 3) what the discourse achieves through this construction. It is a ‘a constructed, occasioned version of events’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992). Accountability is considered e.g. infidelity is generally blameworthy; the importance of accountability varying from the trivial in reminiscences with friends to the important in legal cases. The key features of the discursive approach are 1) a focus on the discourse whilst bracketing out reality, 2) a shift from the events of the past to the discourse, 3) a focus on the reality as constructed through the discourse, 4) a move to a social and shared frame, 5) a move towards considering the cultural framework, 6) a use of the participants own categories.

Understanding narratives begins by illustrating how Gergen (1994) picked out the way that young adults find that their wellbeing follows a U shape, the trough being around 15. However, they tended to fit their events to the narrative of ‘happy childhood’, ‘troubled adolescence’ and ‘positive young adulthood’ through selective recall. Similarly older adults fitted their facts to the narrative of peak well-being around mid-50s with a decline thereafter (Gergen, 2004): narrative dictates memory. In general, people’s recall of past events is moulded by these narratives (Tileagă, 2011) and is thus dictated by the society in which they live (Middleton and Brown, 2005). The discursive approach helps tease out the various influences on remembering (Middleton and Brown, 2005; Edwards and Potter, 2006; Wetherell, 2007; Kaposi, 2011). Collective remembering discusses family memories Bruner (1990) and national memories (Taylor and Wetherell, 1999) and notes that national memories aren’t just the accumulation of each person’s individual memories but include commemorations and also omit groups of people from the accounts.

Analysing autobiographical talk: unpacking the analytic concepts of ‘narrative’ and ‘trouble’ Narrative starts off by noting the micro and macro approach that is used (Wetherell, 1998). Narrative is the consideration of patterns (Gergen, 1994) and ‘canonical
narratives’ (i.e. those that are taken for granted) (Bruner, 1990). Narrative also has a temporal dimension i.e. before and after, also cause and effect. Narrative-discursive uses the definition of structure of sequence or consequence (Taylor, 2006, 2010; Taylor and Littleton, 2006): essentially a story. Narratives are considered as both resources and as constructions that can be used (Taylor, 2006). Trouble and dilemmas trouble is, as it implies, occurs when there are discrepancies between the speaker’s aim to present a positive image and what has been said in the discourse and which therefore requires some repair work to correct the damage by justifying it in some way. A dilemma follows the usual definition of being a forced choice between two difficult alternatives, but in a social rather than an individual context (Billig, 1988) e.g. in the ADHD example the choice of medication avoids the label of ‘bad parent’ but requires the avoidance of labelling them as someone who wants to medicate their child. The study of single women by Reynolds and Taylor (2005) (see DD307, chapter 4) brings out that the aspect of a ‘coupledom narrative’ with its stages of love, marriage and parenthood which, of course, does not fit with the narrative of single women thus labelling them as lacking or not having progressed. This in contrast to single men who do have a narrative outside coupledom which features work and public life rather than family (Heilbrun, 1988), a narrative that seems not to be available to single women. In the absence of a suitable narrative to fall back on, Reynolds notes that they instead use major life events to signal the progression through their lives and gives the example that leaving a relationship was seen as a progression just as entering one is seen as progression in the coupledom narrative.

Memory and autobiographical talk as evidence looks at a study of people entering creative occupations, at the early stages of their careers (Taylor, 2011; Taylor and Littleton, 2012). Having familiarised themselves with the data (some 500 pages of transcripts), the found patterns emerging out of the early lives of the participants: 1) references to another creative in the family: creative inheritance, 2) growing up in a creative environment: creative milieu and 3) claiming to be creative from a young age: early interest.