Foreign Perspectives

The first thing to note is that Australia is big, really big. Not only is there different geography including the usual city, coastal, countryside, and mountains but there’s entirely different climates to consider too. So, for example, if you’re looking up north around Darwin you can have monsoons, around Alice Springs you’ve got major heat in the summer, and in Tasmania you’ve basically got a normal (for UK people) climate. Hence, we’re concentrating our search in Tasmania.

In addition to a temperate climate, Tasmania has a whole lot fewer people: the population density is around 1/20th of what I’m used to locally. That different population density obviously affects the traffic density too which is obvious to me now but confused me initially. One consequence of that lower traffic density is that you can expand the radius that you’re considering for a property. In my initial searches, I used distance as the decider but it turns out that you can drive a whole lot further in twenty minutes in Tasmania than you can in twenty minutes in Belfast.

Unless you’re planning on living in the wilds (of which there’s a lot in Tasmania), there’s essentially two major population centres: Launceston and Hobart. Hobart is the capital and we found that there’s a lot more traffic there than there is in Launceston, as you’d expect from the larger population (about 200,000 vs 80,000). This is also reflected in the house prices: something that would sell for around A$700,000 in Launceston is more like A$1,000,000 in Hobart. That said, if you drive just ten minutes further out of the centre, an equivalent Hobart property is down to A$800,000 or so: it surprised me no end how much the prices changed if you added an extra ten minutes distance.

So, what are we looking for? Well, we have two slightly conflicting objectives in that Wendy and I will be retiring, whereas the boys will be looking for work, which means that we can’t be too far from their employment, hence our searches are looking for somewhere within about 30 minutes drive of either Launceston or Hobart. We’d also like somewhere with “a bit” of land so, notionally, minimum of a couple of acres, but not loads of acres, although we’ve found that isn’t as cut and dried as it first appeared as, for example, 100 acres of forest is probably easier to look after than 2 acres of landscaped garden. We’re not moving for about two to three years, so the prices will obviously have changed over that time but we’re using as a rough guideline A$800,000 as our maximum. Interestingly, when we were looking up to April, we seemed to need that A$800,000 but looking in July we found a number of suitable properties around A$600,000. Other than that, we’re just looking for three bedrooms minimum but even that’s not so clear-cut as you’d expect as Australian homes come with the usual bedrooms, kitchens, bathrooms, living rooms that you’d expect but also things labelled “study” (which could equally be a bedroom), rumpus rooms, entertainment rooms, workshops, storerooms, and a whole host of other categories, many of which I’ve never heard of.

They have open viewings in Australia so we were able to visit several properties whilst we were there (you can search for these via https://www.realestate.com.au/buy/inspection-times-1; they appear up to a week or so ahead). One thing that was clear right away was that the estate agent descriptions were very accurate, but equally clear was that we also needed to know more about the surrounding area of the property that we’d be buying. To partially get around that, you can use satellite view and street view on google maps, which we were doing, but it’s a lot clearer when you’re driving up to the property and having a look around. For example, one property we went to see was just hemmed in between two others and the back garden was pretty much a sheer drop, neither of which were obvious from our online investigations. Equally though, another property has what’s essentially a small national forest in its back garden which was beautiful but not at all obvious from the estate agent description or photos: in fact that property was one we’d buy if this were two years from now, yet, ironically not one that we’d have looked at buying.

What we’ve been mainly using to do our searches is https://www.realestate.com.au (that link takes you directly to one of our searches). There’s also https://www.domain.com.au/ but we found that the facilities on it weren’t so good. The RealEstate site lets you add filters, the key ones for us being the number of bedrooms, maximum price, and minimum land. You’re best to look for one less bedroom than you think you need as it will include houses with other types of rooms that you could just as easily use as a bedroom, so we actually would like four but search for three. House type is “interesting” as it’s, of course, Australian style so you’ve the usual house, townhouse, villa, retirement living, and apartment, but also acreage, rural and land which can all include houses on them. There’s also a map search option which we’ve found to be very useful as you don’t need to know what postcode areas you want your property to be in. Once we’d done a bunch of searches, we noticed that one particular estate agent seemed to turn up in a fair number of them: Neil Hawkins and, funnily enough, he was at one of the properties that we went to visit too! I suspect that’s a common occurrence in that a particular estate agent will likely specialise in the properties that you like yourself. I’m not 100% sure that we’ll end up buying our property via Neil, but I wouldn’t be surprised if we ended up doing that.

We thought at the outset that a scouting trip was essential, and it did indeed prove to be very useful. Whilst most people doing that kind of thing stay in a hotel and then just scoot around the areas that they’re interested in, we chose a self-catering property in an area that we’d previously been looking at for properties. That gave us the opportunity to get a feel for what it might be like living there and the boys pointed out later that it felt like we were living there. For Tasmania, that was Cherry Top Farmstay which is on the edge of Lilydale. It turns out that Lilydale did indeed feel like the kind of village which we’d want to be close to (we don’t want to be in a village though) as it has all the services you need i.e. decent supermarket, post office, medical centre, a small group of takeaways, coffee shops, a tavern, a petrol station, a school, and even a swimming pool. We were there for almost two weeks and were able to cover just about all the things we were aiming to do so we checked out how to sign up for Medicare, change the driving licence over, and saw round a number of other areas that we’d been considering. That said, there were a bunch of things that we couldn’t fit into the time available and we’d have needed at least another week. We’d also have liked more time to explore round Hobart as the two days didn’t really cut it, although it did highlight some negatives (the traffic) and positives (Cygnet). Our trip also had the advantage of highlighting some things that we particularly liked such as the small village feel of Lilydale and put us off Sidmouth a bit as it doesn’t seem to have that, although on paper it seems to.

As I say, we’re aiming to move around 2027 or so but we’re going to continue to look now and again as we build our evidence for my visa application that, all being well, we’ll be submitting late 2026.

Copyright © 2004-2014 by Foreign Perspectives. All rights reserved.

It’s been a while since the last post here! Turns out that home schooling plus real life plus blogging would require more hours in the day than there are available.

For those missing the final couple of segments of the psychology notes, they’re coming over the next few months.

So, we’re preparing for another international move, to Australia this time. We’re just back from our initial scouting trip which let us look at a few potential locations and an initial look at a few houses that would be along the lines of what we’re hoping to buy in due course. Moving to Australia is a bit more complicated than moving to France was as we (well “I”) need to apply for a visa rather than just turning up as we did when we moved to France.

We started preparations late last year when I created my IMMI account (https://online.immi.gov.au/lusc/login) which is what you use to apply for an Australian visa these days. Unfortunately, there’s no option to produce a printed version of the form so to find out what documents and whatnot you need, you’ll need to go through the whole application adding in “to be added later” or the equivalent in the various text boxes. And, there’s a LOT of information and documents that they want!

One issue that we noted as we moved through the form and looked at what others before us have done is that it’s largely geared up to couples that have been together for a couple of years and, paradoxically, much harder if you’ve been together for 20+ years as we have been. Now, I know you’re thinking that “hey, we’re married and have a couple of kids, it’ll be easy”. Nope. Each child you have just proves that you were together one day nine months before they were born, similarly for that marriage certificate. What they’re looking for is evidence that you’ve been together continuously for all those years, right up to the point when you submit the application. So, for example, the “relationship history” that you each need to write needs to cover the period from when you first met, all significant events since then, right up to the day you hit “submit” on your application.

In practice, we have found that we’re going to need to create the evidence because we haven’t been saving it up all those years. Seeing as they will be looking at this blog as part of the evidence: dear immigration officer, I know that sounds really bad, but honestly we’ve been together for over 20 years as you’ll see from this blog!

The immigration people like to see that you’ve been on holiday together which you’d think would be a doddle to prove. However, it turns out that the airlines don’t keep records going way back and we only have insurance for one holiday naming all of us because we’re on the Nationwide insurance now and it doesn’t work as proof. Accommodation booking only take the name on the credit card so are no use either. Photos sound good, but although we’ve heaps of photos, we’ve very few with both of us in them and have been making a point of doing joint selfies lately to start creating that evidence.

Copyright © 2004-2014 by Foreign Perspectives. All rights reserved.

Chapter 5 Developmental psychology: cognitive development and epistemologies runs to around 40 pages and is one of the chapters for TMA3. It will have a fairly familiar feel for anyone who has done one of the child development modules.

Introduction gives a very brief overview of how diverse the fields of study are in developmental psychology and equally how diverse the methods used are.

Piagetian and Vygotskian perspectives on cognitive development. A Piagetian perspective introduces Piaget’s constructivist approach built on the idea that children construct their understanding of the world by way of developing schemas and take place over a number of stages in their lives. So, we have from 1-4 months primary circular reactions (i.e. repetitive motions centred on themselves), from 4-8 months secondary circular motions (i.e. repetitive motions with effects away from their body) and from 12-18 months tertiary circular reactions which are experimental in nature. His theory is based on the idea that all children in all cultures will process through a series of stages in their lives: birth to 2 years sensorimotor (developing object permanence), 2-7 years preoperational (use of language to represent objects), 7-11 years concrete operational (logical reasoning, mastering conservation), 11-18 years formal operational (logical thought applied to abstract ideas). This implies that play is an important element in development although the relationship between play and guided play differs between cultures. Criticism of this approach comes from many angles in particular that individual children can be at different stages in different domains at any given point in their lives. Piagetian methods illustrates the development of his ideas through his work with Binet on IQ scales where he was interested in the errors that children made and in particular the systematic way in which this happened. He noted that children weren’t miniature adults and emphasised the idea that children needed to be allowed to talk freely in research, avoiding too many questions but rather allowing them to elaborate on their thinking: moving towards open-ended questions and semi-structured interviews. His three mountains task (Piaget, 1969) illustrated the egocentric nature of children and is difficult for 4-5 year olds but easy enough at 9-10. Other tasks were around conservation of mass, volume and number which proved difficult before around 7 (i.e. at preoperational stage) as are class inclusion problems (e.g. are there more red flowers or more flowers in a bunch of red and yellow flowers)(Goswami, 2014). He didn’t consider the effects of peers and the social situation on learning until much later nor did he consider the human sense aspect (e.g. hiding from a policeman variant of the three mountains task and similar variants of the conservation tasks [Donaldson, 1983]). A Vygotskian perspective takes a social-constructivist approach developing using the concept of the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) and scaffolding of learning: cultural tools together with social interaction produce the skills and abilities that we see. Vygotskian methods presented problems for children to solve but with the addition of cues e.g. The blocks test asks children to sort blocks into categories with odd names and observes how they develop the meaning of the categorisation. Children’s self-talk explores how Vygotsky saw the disappearance of self-talk around 4-7 represented the internalisation of the concepts. This generally reappears when difficult tasks are encountered even later in life (Smith, 2007). Social-constructivist interventions Looking at talk within classrooms, Lyle (2008) noted that 90% of it consisted of closed responses in the Initiate, Response, Feedback pattern. Mercer (1995) considered the types of interactions that were used, with Warwick (2013) finding that exploratory talk was the most useful. Mercer (2014) went on to develop interventions aiming to teach the styles of speech that were required to develop collaborative working. Mercer (2006) found that these interventions improved their performance over a range of topic areas i.e. as Vygotsky would have it, developing their social skills affected their thinking skills more generally.

Measuring beliefs about epistemology begins by highlighting the teachers’s beliefs about epistemology affect how they teach. Thus a Piagetian approach will assume that children develop in set stages whilst a Vygotskyian one will emphasise social learning. Self-report questionnaires are generally used to explore the impact of these beliefs. Self-report questionnaires are developed starting from a literature review before a pilot then moving on to factor analysis. Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) (Schommer, 1990) used a Likert scale on a range of questions such as ‘Successful students understand things quickly.’ From this, the factor analysis came up with four factors with good reliability: Fixed ability, Simple knowledge, Quick learning and Certain knowledge. Hofer’s Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire (EBQ) groups the factors into the nature of knowing (what knowledge is: the certainty and simplicity of knowledge) and the process of knowing (how you come to understand knowledge: the source and justification of knowledge). Erdamar and Alpan (2013) used this to consider the belief systems: fixed and certain, coming from authority figures through to complex and the need to put effort into learning. However, Schraw (2013) found that the EQ didn’t cover everything and seemed to be and went on to develop Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) to address the shortcomings. Others such as Tümkaya (2012) have gone on to add demographic and personal details producing a three factor model: ‘the belief concerning that learning depends on effort’, ‘the belief concerning that learning depends on ability’, and ‘the belief concerning that there is one unchanging truth’. As always, there is a cultural element to this and Chi-Kin Lee (2013) using EQ in China found an authority/expert factor not in the original EQ. What is culture though? Tümkaya (2012) considered university students from different faculties finding that social science students emphasised the importance of learning on effort and context whilst medical students emphasised innate ability. The case of inclusive education introduces the idea of key word signing as a way of supporting the communication skills of those with severe learning difficulties e.g. the use of Signalong which is based on British Sign Language. This is key word signing rather than a fully developed sign language. Some evidence suggests that a social-constructivist approach works best in inclusive class rooms (Mercer, 2009) which in turn implies that those teachers would have an epistemology of social-constructivism but few studies have considered this (Florian and Black-Hawkins, 2011). Sheehy and Budiyanto (2014) considered this in Indonesia (mainly on the videos). Pompeo (2011) indicated that reflecting on one’s epistemological beliefs can help improve them and hence social science students tend to be more sophisticated in terms of epistemology than science students.

Reference: Sheehy, K. (2016). Developmental psychology: cognitive development and epistemologies. In Ness, H., Kaye, H. and Stenner, P. (2016). Investigating Psychology 3. Milton Keynes: The Open University.

Copyright © 2004-2014 by Foreign Perspectives. All rights reserved.

Chapter 4 Language, thought and culture runs to about 50 pages and is one of the optional chapters on the first TMA.

Introduction this is a very brief introduction to what is to follow in the chapter, touching on the concept of language, moving on to concepts and the idea that the speakers of different languages actually think differently and some difficulties in the use of language in experiments.

What is language? Aitchison (2008) points out that all normal human beings speak and that we have come to consider language as something that only humans do. However, Clarke (2006) found that gibbons in Thailand also employ a form of speech, albeit a somewhat simpler one than typical human languages. Clearly English has a great deal more vocabulary than the gibbon language but it also has a grammar which non-human languages don’t (Sampson, 2009). Aitchison (2008) identifies a range of characteristics which languages possess: 1) a vocal-auditory channel (although other channels can be used e.g. braille uses touch), 2) it is arbitrary i.e. the symbol used to represent an object does not resemble the object, 3) it has a semanticity i.e. the symbols used are generalisable e.g. we can refer to a specific dog or dogs in general, 4) spontaneous usage, 5) we employ turn-taking, 6) it has a duality thus the letters in dog only form the symbol for dog when combined, 7) human languages use cultural transmission i.e. we must learn languages whereas birds develop songs even when raised in isolation (not an experiment that would get ethical approval with humans!), 8) we can use displacement i.e. talk about things that aren’t happening here and now, finally 9) structure-dependence, 10) creativity and 11) we can mind-read are all considered human-only language features. Chomsky (1957) in particular stressed the structure-dependence (i.e. grammar) aspect and noted that it is easy to produce grammatically correct but nonsense sentences and also that many of our sentences are unique. The ability to anticipate intentions isn’t entirely limited to humans as Tomasello (2010) highlighted with his example of chimpanzees passing food to humans but noted that they don’t tend to form joint goals. Warneken (2006) demonstrated that toddlers and human-raised chimpanzees would co-operate in goal directed activities but the chimpanzees did not participate in social games without a goal in mind and moreover did not attempt to re-engage the humans who had withdrawn from the activities.

What are concepts made of? Introduces the idea of concepts as mental categories which have a series of attributes which are necessary and sufficient. In particular in this classical view, anything having those attributes is just as good an example of the category as any other thing with those attributes. Prototype theory takes Rosch’s (1973) idea that some exemplars are better examples of the concept than others e.g. an orangey-red isn’t as good an example of red as a “proper red” and similarly some fruits are better examples of fruits than others e.g. an apple is a better examplar than an olive. As always, the experiment had some limitations, in particular what does it mean to be a good example? Did that just mean to some participants how enjoyable it was rather than how typical it was? Also apple is a much more commonly used word (“A is for Apple”…) though Mervis (1976) ruled this out. Other typicality effects such as the estimation of the chance of a cross-species infection have been found (Rips, 1975) and Mervis (1980) found that children acquire vocabulary in order of typicality. Why this typicality effect exists was found to the more typical exemplars having more features of the category e.g. a robin is clearly a more typical bird than an ostrich and less typical exemplars overlap with other categories (e.g. bats aren’t great examples of mammals) (Rosch and Mervis, 1975). The best examples of a category are called prototypes and have all the required attributes but none of those from other categories. Kurbat’s 1994 study using images showed that typicality wasn’t confined to words and meanings and Kempton illustrated the cultural differences in prototypes using boots finding army boots worked in the UK and cowboy boots worked in the US. The knowledge approach Murphy’s knowledge approach (2004) contrasts with Roche’s prototype theory in considering that concepts are richer than simple dictionary definitions. Barsalou (1983) illustrated this by using ad hoc categories such as “ways to avoid being killed by the Mafia”. Stanfield and Zwann (2001) found that the concepts had other properties so that sentences with nails hammered into walls got a swifter response when the nail illustration was horizontal than when it was vertical i.e. the orientation of the nail was part of the concept of something being hammered into a wall. Hampton (1987) found that there was feature cancellation so that in asking for pets that are also birds, migration wasn’t mentioned as a property. Fodor (1998) noted that prototype theory implies that a prototypical pet fish should be cuddly as prototypical pets are. Conceptual combination was investigated by Keil (2000) who found that emergent features were associated with phrases but not to the underlying words e.g. arctic bicycles had spiked tyres yet neither arctic nor bicycle had. The knowledge vs typicality argument was found by Proffitt (2000) where tree experts estimated the likelihood of a disease being transmitted between species whereas Rips (1975) found in non-experts it was typicality that dominated in estimations of transmission of bird disease, as one would expect. Smith and Sloman (1994) found that knowledge was used when the participants had to give reasons for their choices.

Do speakers of different languages think differently? Introduces the idea that the language which we use to speak influences, but does not determine, what we can think. Language effects on colour discrimination considers whether the words that we have in our language for colours influences the colours we can see e.g. Russian has words for blue and light blue comparable to the English red and pink. Franklin (2005) considers that the colours are hard-wired whereas Goldstein (2009) considers that they are influenced by the language that we use. For example, Himba doesn’t have words for blue and green. As it turns out, Goldstein (2009) found that they could distinguish them but at the blue-purple and green-blue ranges they behaved like English children who didn’t know the names for the colours although there are issues around the environment in which they are raised: Himba are in a desert with limited colour range whilst the English children see all kinds of colours. Winawer (2007) found an advantage for Russian speakers in distinguishing light-blue from dark-blue (for which they have different words) over English speakers. Language effects on more abstract concepts considers whether this colour effect can be extended to more abstract concepts such as time. This goes into some detail on the experiments that Boroditsky (2001, 2011) conducted to examine Mandarin and English speakers way of thinking about time (vertically vs horizontally) and found that there are differences but this could be a function of experience rather than a function of language experience.

Does perception influence thought? Does language experience affect cognition or is it that language arises out of the perceptual experience? Barsalou (1999) went even further, suggesting that the cognition is accompanied by the experience e.g. if you think of the word “up” then the areas of your brain carrying out the actions are also activated I.e the cognition is embodied. Traditionally cognition is regarded as abstract i.e. disembodied (Kaye, 2010). This has transducers translating into a domain-specific modality (audio, visual, etc.) and then an amodal central processing function. There is evidence that the embodied (i.e. grounded in physical experience) is the way that it works (e.g. egg and chips vs chicken and egg). Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) used an ‘action-sentence compatibility effect’ to demonstrate this e.g. ‘Joe sang the cards to you’ doesn’t make sense whereas ‘You gave the earring to Susan’ does. Borghi et al. (2004) used an inside/outside metaphor e.g. fuelling the car (outside), driving the car (inside) using probe words such as tyre and steering wheel, it being easier when the word matched the location (i.e. fuelling the car going with tyre); this also worked with shapes e.g. flat palm went with smoothing the table cloth.

Reference: Kirkbride, S. and Smith, M. C. (2016). Language, thought and culture. In Ness, H., Kaye, H. and Stenner, P. (2016). Investigating Psychology 3. Milton Keynes: The Open University.Copyright © 2004-2014 by Foreign Perspectives. All rights reserved.

Book 1, Chapter 3 Memory in the real world runs to around 50 pages and is one of the three optional chapters on the first TMA.

Introduction highlights some of the difficulties of experimenting in real-world experiments e.g. lack of controls, lack of objective facts to compare the memories against and the ethical issues. What can experiments tell us about remembering falsely? The approach in experimentation follows an encoding phase, provision of post-event information (which may be false) and retrieval. Loftus has explored the provision of misleading information through leading questions, discussions with co-witnesses and been able to influence the remembering of childhood incidents that didn’t happen and even short term food preferences. Chandler (2001) found that these false memory effects were temporary i.e. that the original memory was retained. The effectiveness of the false memory was found to depend on how plausible it was (Walther and Blank, 2004). Taking false memory into the laboratory starts by discussing the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) concept of inducing false memories implicitly e.g. inducing participants to remember that they heard “bed” when the initial list was duvet, pillow, sheet, etc. Zhu (2013) found that the underpinning mechanism in DRM false memories and explicit ones appeared to be different.

Laboratory experimentation points out that although psychology laboratories may be essentially normal offices, the environment remains an artificial one. A laboratory experiment on the other-race effect reports on Anzures (2014) study of children’s recognition of faces from other races which found that there was no statistical difference in recognition from 5 to 10 year olds although they did recognise Chinese faces less accurately. Extrapolating to the real world points out a number of limitations to Anzures experiment: it was artificial setting, it used artificial stimuli (e.g. it was a 2D photo), the task was artificial (2AFC, in rapid succession), it used an artificially short time-span, it utilised explicit memory and the consequentiality and motivation was clearly quite different than in a line-up situation. Thus, on the whole, ecological validity was somewhat lacking: as Gibson (1979) illustrated, a picture of a pipe is not itself a pipe.

Face recognition introduces the concept that face recognition may involve a special type of memory. Are faces special? Our exposure to examplars of the category face is clearly much greater than for other categories and moreover, whilst we don’t need to distinguish between individual pineapples, we do need to distinguish between individual faces. But are we treating faces in a fundamentally different way? Face specificity or expertise? Introduces Prosopagnosia (the inability to recognise faces) and points out that people can have that whilst being able to recognise everyday objects or vice versa (Farah, 1991, McMullen, 2001). Although this seems to imply that faces are recognised differently, it could equally be that the damage was to areas involved in more general processing, e.g. memory of fine detail. Yin (1969) noted that when objects are presented upside down, everything except faces is recognised, which he suggests is evidence that face recognition is a different type of process. However, Bruyer and Crispeels (1992) showed that it was more an aspect of familiarity with the exemplars than specifically of faces that differentiated the upside down slowing down of recognition. This expert effect has been demonstrated in training (Rossion, 2002) but not with experts on birds (Gauthier, 2000) and other categories. Familiarity in face recognition discusses the different quality of recognition that comes with familiarity: we can recognised friends immediately even after many years but have difficulty in picking out someone who we have not seen a great deal: a familiarity effect that applies equally to groups. Biases in face recognition considers the Other Race Effect (ORE), the relative difficulty in recognising faces from different races. Brigham and Malpass (1985) showed that this was an aspect of familiarity. There is also some evidence of an Own-Age Bias (OAB), although this seems less consistent. Bartlett and Leslie (1986) showed that younger participants recognised faces around their own age better than they recognised older ones but that the older ones didn’t have that bias, although there are issues around their age banding. Other studies with tighter banding have shown the effect at all age bands (Perfect and Moon, 2005 and others). The level of contact is considered the deciding factor with the cognitive approach of Hancock and Rhodes (2008) coming down on the level of experience and essentially training being the decider. However, it could be argued that it is a social categorisation effect that determines how we process the face e.g. the categorisation-individuation model (CIM) (Hugenberg et al., 2013) which suggests that the categorisation happens first with only the in-group being considered at an individual level. Practical implications of biases in face recognition illustrates that this ranges from embarassment to potentially major issues in line-up identification. This is something of a problem as eyewitnesses are believed about 70% of time whether or not they seem reliable (Loftus, 1983). Whilst the laboratory studies have a lot of power (lots of participants, each with lots of data points), they are severely lacking in ecological validity both in normal life and in line-up situations.

Eyewitness evidence just points out how crucial effective eyewitness evidence can be. Identity parades (line-ups) starts off by describing the simultaneous and sequential line-up procedures with Stelbay’s (2001) finding that the sequential line-ups were more accurate. However, McQuiston-Surrett (2006) found that sequential line-ups were only more effective when the perpetrator wasn’t present i.e. they reduced the chance of identifying a suspect who was innocent. In simultaneous line-ups, the person who looks most like the perpetrator may be chosen even when they are instructed that the perpetrator may not be present due to pressure from the situational context (Mermon, 2003). By contrast, in sequential line-ups, they are forced to make absolute decisions rather than relative ones. The mystery man procedure introduces the idea of having a mystery-man in the line-up specifically for children so that they can select the mystery-man as a positive “don’t know” selection which overcomes the pressure that children feel to make any selection in the situation (Havard and Memon, 2013). Applied memory experiments highlights the differences between Anzures (2014) experiment which used large numbers of images but required a forced choice seconds later vs Havard and Memon (2013) which used a video viewed once and tested recognition a few days later i.e. having much higher ecological validity. What affects eyewitness evidence? Considers the effects of estimator variables (those outside the control of the criminal justice system such as those to do with the witness and the characteristics of the crime e.g. lighting levels, distance of the witness from the action) and system variables (those under the control of the criminal justice system such as the nature of the line-ups and questioning). Wagenaar and van der Schrier (1996) suggested a Rule of 15 which states that for accuracy the limits are 15m and 15 lux. Even in ideal circumstances, Flin and Shepherd (1986) found that there was a tendency to underestimate above average characteristics and over estimate below average ones i.e. there was a tendency to average out. Cutler (1987) found that the presence of a weapon reduced the accuracy of identification still further. To improve accuracy, sequential line-ups can be used and specific instructions rather than just asking who it is (Cutler et al., 1987).

Reference: Harrison, G., Ness, H. and Pike, G. (2016). Memory in the real world. In Ness, H., Kaye, H. and Stenner, P. (2016). Investigating Psychology 3. Milton Keynes: The Open University.Copyright © 2004-2014 by Foreign Perspectives. All rights reserved.